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SMALL INVESTMENTS, BIG LOSSES:
THE STATES’ ROLE IN PROTECTING LOCAL
INVESTORS FROM SECURITIES FRAUD
Carlos Berdejó*
Abstract: The securities regulation landscape has changed dramatically in recent years.
Federal laws have increasingly preempted the regulatory power of states, while at the same
time expanding the universe of securities offerings that are not subject to registration at the
federal level. These political and policy choices reflect a balancing of two sometimes
competing goals: protecting investors and facilitating capital formation. While policies
centered on preemption and deregulation might reduce the cost of raising capital, these could
also lead to more pervasive securities fraud. Any resulting increase in fraudulent practices is
likely to disproportionately affect small securities offerings that are local in nature, for which
the deterrent effect of private securities litigation and public enforcement is weaker. This
places unsophisticated and non-wealthy investors, those less capable to absorb financial
losses, at a disproportionate risk of fraud. From a broader economic perspective, the social
welfare implications of such fraudulent securities offerings may be significant even when the
amounts involved in each individual transaction appear to be relatively trivial to the casual
observer.
This Article identifies and theorizes the under-regulation of small-scale securities
transactions that results from the confluence of federal preemption and the weakness of
traditional enforcement mechanisms that are better suited to large-scale fraud. This Article is
also the first to identify and analyze the economic and policy implications of two existing
and potential trends in state regulation that might mitigate this state of affairs. In the last two
decades, a growing number of states have broadened the remedies available to their securities
commissioners in administrative actions to include the ability to request or order restitution
on behalf of injured investors. The second trend is at a more nascent stage. Recently, some
states have experimented with public insurance-type schemes that allow defrauded investors
to recover a portion of their losses. The renewed emphasis on compensating victims of fraud
highlighted by these developments is encouraging, but more states should follow suit. To that
end, this Article makes a series of normative suggestions to improve the effectiveness of
these state legislative responses and to promote their more widespread adoption.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 2007, the following advertisement appeared in the
classified section of the Missoulian1 under the heading “Investments”:
24% well-secured fixed 1 yr. yield w/ Go Zone trusts.
Help rebuild booming Gulf Coasts. Terry, [phone number].2
Attracted by the prospects of a twenty-four percent return, Rece
Cobeen, a resident of Montana, responded to the ad and contacted Terry
Parks.3 Between April 19, 2007, and July 15, 2008, Cobeen invested a
total of $55,000, most of his life savings, in exchange for notes.4 The
notes were not registered with any state or federal agency and Parks
never provided Cobeen with any type of written disclosure document
relating to the notes or Parks’s activities.5 After July 2008, Cobeen had
become suspicious of Parks’s motives and the extraordinarily high
interest rate that he had been promised.6 Cobeen contacted Parks and
asked for his money back, but Parks refused to return the money7 and
subsequently relocated to Texas.8
What could Cobeen do at this point? A natural response is that he
should look to the federal securities laws, namely the 1933 Securities
Act (Securities Act)9 and the 1934 Exchange Act (Exchange Act),10 that
employ various devices to protect investors from fraudulent offerings.11
For example, the registration requirements of the Securities Act mandate
the disclosure of information to investors prior to the sale of securities.12

1. MISSOULIAN, Classifieds, http://missoulian.com/ads/ (last visited May 1, 2017).
2. State v. Parks, 310 P.3d 1088, 1089 (Mont. 2013). “Go Zone” refers to the “Gulf Opportunity
Zone,” coastal areas in Louisiana devastated by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. See id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1089–90. See also Press Release, Office of the Mont. State Auditor, Comm’r of Sec. &
Ins.,
Hurricane
Relief
Scam
Victim
Receives
Restitution
(July 9,
2012),
http://csimt.gov/news/hurricane-relief-scam-victim-receives-restitution
[https://perma.cc/WT27YCHW].
5. Parks, 310 P.3d at 1090–91.
6. Id. Cobeen had only received a $400 interest payment on June 2007. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Joe Nickell, Missoula Man Gets 10 Years in Prison for Illegally Selling $55K in
Investments, MISSOULIAN (Feb. 25, 2012), http://missoulian.com/news/local/missoula-man-getsyears-in-prison-for-illegally-selling-k/article_71a8750a-5f65-11e1-9d21-0019bb2963f4.html
[https://perma.cc/S2DW-AXME].
9. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012).
11. See infra section I.A.
12. See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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Those who fail to meet these registration requirements or commit fraud
in the materials provided to investors face liability under the Act’s
investor-friendly civil liability provisions.13
But not all securities transactions are created equal. Although the
federal securities laws apply to all offers and sales of securities, the
extent of regulation varies from transaction to transaction. Certain
offerings are exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act, leaving investors with fewer protections against opportunistic
promoters.14 As it turns out, many of these exemptions cover small and
local offerings, which present a disproportionate risk of failure and
fraud.15 Complicating matters further for investors like Cobeen, there has
been a persistent trend towards increasing the number and expanding the
scope of these exemptions.16 But even if Cobeen’s transaction was
exempt from registration, Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act would likely
afford him some protection. Rule 10b-5, the catch-all antifraud
provision, applies to all securities transactions, whether or not they are
exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act.17
Determining whether he has a valid cause of action under the federal
securities laws would be just part of Cobeen’s calculus. Bringing a
lawsuit is a costly and risky proposition: not only would Cobeen have to
spend additional resources in attorney fees, but he would face the
prospect of losing the lawsuit or being unable to enforce and recover a
judgment against Parks.18 This, of course, is a predicament faced by all
defrauded investors, and various mechanisms, such as contingency fees,
class actions, and public enforcement by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), have developed in response.19 Unfortunately for
Cobeen, these mechanisms often do not work well for small, local
transactions. Although $55,000 certainly is a substantial amount of
money for Cobeen, it likely is not large enough to make it economically
practical for the SEC or a private plaintiff’s attorney to pursue an
action.20
Cobeen could also explore state securities laws that may afford him
protection. Registration and information disclosure requirements provide
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 43–52 and accompanying text.
See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
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an ex ante mechanism to weed-out, or at least alert investors to,
fraudulent offerings.21 However, the prophylactic effect of these
provisions has been blunted by federal law, which has increasingly
preempted state registration requirements for certain offerings that are
exempt from federal registration, leaving investors with fewer ex ante
regulatory protections.22 State securities laws also contain anti-fraud
provisions that mirror their federal counterparts.23 But even if Cobeen
had a claim under state law, he would still face the costs and risk
associated with pursuing his claim in court and enforcing his judgment
were he to prevail.
Cobeen ultimately filed a complaint with the Montana Commissioner
of Securities and Insurance, who then filed an action against Parks for
securities fraud and selling securities without registration.24 In October
2011, a jury found Parks guilty and the judge imposed a ten-year
sentence.25 From society’s perspective, this outcome is desirable, as it
provides more power to the deterrent effects of the securities laws and
discourages future fraudulent activities. But what could motivate Cobeen
to file a complaint with the securities commissioner and cooperate with
the investigation and trial, admitting publicly that he was taken
advantage of in such manner? Having Parks sentenced to ten years of
imprisonment may provide a sense of retribution for Cobeen, but it does
not compensate him for his substantial monetary loss. In fact, with Parks
imprisoned and unable to work, recovery in a civil action becomes an
even more unlikely prospect.
As it turns out, Montana law allows the state securities administrator
to request the court to grant an order of restitution on behalf of
defrauded investors.26 So, in addition to the ten-year prison term, the
judge also ordered restitution—i.e., that Parks return to Cobeen the
balance of his $55,000 investment.27 This result highlights a recent trend
in securities regulation and the protection of small investors at the state
level. A growing number of states have expanded the authority of their
state securities administrators, authorizing them to request that a court
grant restitution in favor of an injured investor even in civil actions

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
State v. Parks, 310 P.3d 1088, 1090–91 (Mont. 2013).
Id. at 1092–93.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-305 (2011).
See Press Release, supra note 4; Nickell, supra note 8.
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brought by administrators.28 Many states have gone further and have
authorized their securities administrators to order restitution as part of an
administrative action.29 These regulatory innovations increase both the
deterrent effect of state law and the likelihood of injured investors
receiving some compensation for their losses.
Unfortunately, the court-ordered restitution appeared to be of little
value to Cobeen, as Parks had spent all of Cobeen’s money and was to
be incarcerated for the near future, making payment of the $55,000
nearly impossible. Once again, Cobeen benefitted from a recent
innovation in states’ securities regulation. Cobeen was able to receive
$13,750 (twenty-five percent of his losses) from the Montana Securities
Restitution Assistance Fund, an insurance-type fund that had been
established a few years earlier to assist victims of securities fraud who
otherwise have no opportunity to receive restitution.30
Cobeen’s story illustrates how the traditional enforcement
mechanisms associated with federal securities regulation, which rely
heavily on the SEC and private class action litigation, neglect a
significant subset of transactions, namely small and local ones. Because
registration is the preeminent mechanism for investor protection, the tilt
towards exempting small-scale securities from registration requirements
has created regulatory lacunae in which small investors are at great risk.
Federal preemption can exacerbate this problem by preventing states
from stepping into the breach and regulating the distribution and sale of
securities.
This under-regulation of small-scale securities transactions, which
results from the confluence of federal preemption and existing civil
remedies that are better suited to address large-scale fraud, is a symptom
of a normative conflict between state and federal securities laws. State
securities laws are “remedial in character, designed to prevent frauds and
impositions upon the public,” and are generally liberally construed to
protect investors.31 The federal securities laws, on the other hand, must
balance the goal of protecting investors with the broader goals of
maintaining the integrity of the national capital markets and facilitating

28. See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 148–63 and accompanying text.
30. See Press Release, supra note 4; infra section II.B.1.b.
31. King v. Pope, 91 S.W.3d 314, 323–24 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting DeWees v. State, 390 S.W.2d
241, 242 (Tenn. 1965)). See also People v. Figueroa, 715 P.2d 680, 695 (Cal. 1986); Ratliffe v.
Hartsfield Co., 184 S.E. 324, 327 (Ga. 1935); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109
(Haw. 1971); State v. Coin Wholesalers, 250 N.W.2d 583, 588 (Minn. 1976).
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capital formation.32 For cases of securities fraud that are national in
scope, the allocation of power between the federal government and the
states does not cause major problems. However, when it comes to cases
involving small, local fraud, the preeminence of federal regulation often
results in a system that can be highly dysfunctional.
Although the amounts involved in these transactions may appear
trivial (relative to the more salient cases that are of interest to the SEC,
plaintiff’s attorneys, and the financial press), the individual losses may
be in fact quite significant, especially if these involve a large percentage
of the victim’s wealth.33 Thus, the social welfare implications of these
small, but numerous, instances of fraud can be substantial and merit the
attention of policy-makers. Regulation and enforcement at the state level
arguably provides a superior toolset to maintain adequate deterrence and
ensure a base level of compensation for victims in these types of
transactions. However, since the power of the states to regulate the
distribution and sale of securities ex ante has been significantly curtailed
by federal legislation preempting state law, states have increasingly
focused their efforts on ex post mechanisms to regulate these
transactions.
This Article identifies and analyzes the economic and policy
implications of two important trends in state regulation and enforcement
that have developed in response to the under-regulation problem
described above. In the last two decades, a growing number of states
have broadened the remedies available to their securities commissioners
in administrative actions to include the ability to request or order
restitution on behalf of injured investors.34 Although this expansion of
32. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2015 SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE &
FINANCIAL INFORMATION 2 (2016) (“The mission of the SEC is to protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”); Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd,” 38
VT. L. REV. 827, 828 (2014) (stating that the “core policy objectives” of securities regulation are
“protect[ing] investors, maintain[ing] the integrity of securities markets, and encourag[ing] capital
formation”); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 340 (2013) (noting the trade-offs
inherent in balancing the goals of investor protection and capital formation).
33. And when considered in the aggregate, the amounts involved in these small transactions can
be quite large. Although each individual offering may be small, the market for private, exempt
securities offerings dwarfs the market for public, registered offerings. In 2014, $2.1 trillion was
raised in 35,637 private placements. Registered offerings, on the other hand, accounted for $1.35
trillion of new capital, raised in 2,752 offerings. See SCOTT BAUGUESS ET AL., CAPITAL RAISING IN
THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009–2014,
at 6–7 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/unregistered-offering10-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U3F6-JD6R].
34. See infra section II.A.
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administrative power enhances the deterrent effect of securities laws and
facilitates compensation for injured investors, concerns relating to
increased costs and procedural fairness are likely preventing broader
adoption. This Article argues that further cooperation and coordination
among states could help address these concerns and encourage more
states to authorize their administrators to order restitution. The second
innovation is more recent. A few states have begun to experiment with
insurance-type schemes that offer defrauded investors partial
compensation for losses suffered as a result of securities violations.35
These newly established restitution funds are promising, but the design
of these programs should carefully consider likely behavioral responses
by investors and administrators to ensure their success. This Article
presents a series of recommendations to address these concerns and
increase the likelihood that other states will establish their own
restitution funds.
More generally, this Article contributes to a number of important
debates in the academic literature. First, it opens new avenues in
longstanding policy discussions over the basic tension between protecting
investors and facilitating capital formation, two fundamental goals of
securities regulation.36 Second, by providing a theoretical framework to
assess the involvement of local governments in the regulation of
securities, this Article adds a new dimension to the literature weighing
the optimal allocation of regulatory power among federal and state
governments in a multijurisdictional framework.37 Finally, this Article is
part of a growing literature evaluating large-scale compensation efforts
by administrative agencies and other public actors.38
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the role of federal
and state law in the regulation of the securities markets, highlighting the
precarious position occupied by victims of small-scale fraud in this
multi-jurisdictional framework. Part II examines and assesses the two
recent innovations of the states in their struggle against securities fraud
described above, underscoring their relationship to two interconnected
goals of securities regulation: deterrence and compensation. Part III
discusses the general implications of these developments and concludes.

35.
36.
37.
38.

See infra section II.B.
See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
See infra section I.B.1.
See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
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THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF SECURITIES
REGULATION

This section begins with an overview of the federal regulation of
securities markets, highlighting how small-scale fraud is unlikely to be
pursued by public or private enforcement of federal law. The second part
of this section focuses on state regulation and, in particular, the role of
state administrators in regulating local securities markets and enforcing
states’ securities laws, a topic that has received limited attention in the
academic literature.
A.

Federal Regulation of the Securities Markets

The federal securities laws provide a wide array of measures to
protect investors. Under the regulatory framework of the Securities Act,
an issuer selling securities must prepare a set of mandatory disclosure
documents, including a registration statement, which must be filed with
the SEC, and a prospectus, which is part of the registration statement and
must be distributed to the investors.39 A sale of unregistered securities
gives rise to Section 12(a)(1) liability, which grants investors rescissory
rights if the securities were offered or sold in violation of the Securities
Act’s registration requirements.40 In addition to mandating the disclosure
of information, the Securities Act contains two civil liability provisions
that protect investors in the event that the information contained in these
disclosure documents is fraudulent. Section 11 of the Securities Act
imposes liability if the registration statement contains a material
misrepresentation,41 while Section 12(a)(2) provides a cause of action
for material misstatements contained in the prospectus.42

39. The Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77z (2012), which governs the primary public offerings
of securities by issuers, provides that, unless otherwise exempt, all offers and sales of securities
must be registered with the SEC. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 2–3 (Kris
Markarian ed., 3d ed. 2011). An issuer may not offer securities to the public unless a registration
statement has been filed with the SEC and sales of such securities cannot be completed until the
registration statement is declared effective by the SEC. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a)–(c); see generally Joan
MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the
Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 907 (2011) (noting broad sweep of Section 5 of the
Securities Act); STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 393–401 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d. ed. 2012) (describing the public offering
process).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). Although the term prospectus can be broadly construed, Section
12(a)(2) is limited to public offerings of securities. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584
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To avoid the costs associated with being subject to the registration
requirements of the Securities Act (and its accompanying civil liability
provisions), an issuer must structure the sales of securities to fit within
an exemption.43 For example, Section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act
provides a statutory exemption from registration for securities offered
and sold to persons residing in a single state by an issuer incorporated in
and doing business in that same state.44 Another, better-known statutory
exemption from registration is found in Section 4(a)(2), which exempts
“transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.”45 Since the
statute does not explicitly define “public offering,” this term has been
construed by the SEC and federal courts as offerings involving investors
who are not “able to fend for themselves.”46
To provide additional clarity and predictability in the use of Section
4(a)(2)’s private placement exemption, the SEC promulgated Regulation
D.47 Rule 506 of Regulation D provides a safe harbor based on Section
4(a)(2)’s private placement exemption, which allows an issuer to offer
and sell, without registration, an unlimited aggregate principal amount of
securities to any number of “accredited investors” so long as certain
conditions are met.48 A Rule 506 offering may include up to thirty-five
(1995) (defining the term “prospectus” as “a document that describes a public offering of
securities”).
43. The rationale behind these exemptions is that the registration safeguards may not be necessary
in certain situations. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933) (noting the inefficiency of requiring
registration “where there is no practical need for [application of the Securities Act] or where the
public benefits are too remote”); C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1133 (1988) (“As a historical matter, Congress did not
design the securities laws to protect investors capable of protecting themselves.”).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11). Generally, an offering qualifies as an “intrastate offering” if it
involves local investors, local companies, and local financing. See Section 3(a)(11) Exemption for
Local Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-4434 (Dec. 6, 1961). Historically, the SEC and the
courts have construed this exemption very narrowly, so issuers trying to rely on this exemption avail
themselves of the Rule 147 safe harbor. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 39, at 583–85. An
offering that meets the requirements of Rule 147 is deemed to qualify for the section 3(a)(11)
intrastate offering exemption. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2015).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
46. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). The Supreme Court held that the
applicability of this exemption “should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected need
the protection of the [Securities] Act,” which is designed “to protect investors by promoting full
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions.” Id. at 124–25.
47. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500–230.508. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 915
(highlighting the clarifying purpose of Regulation D).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a), (c). The definition of “accredited investor” includes certain
institutional investors, such as banks and insurance companies, individuals with a net worth over $1
million (excluding the investor’s primary residence) or annual income over $200,000 for the
previous two years, private business development companies, certain trusts and business
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investors that are non-accredited, so long as they are able to evaluate the
potential gains and risks associated with the investment and the issuer
refrains from engaging in general solicitation.49 Another set of
exemptions contained in Regulation D, Rule 50450 (which exempts
offerings under $1 million) and Rule 50551 (which exempts offerings
under $5 million), are based on Section 3(b)(1) of the Securities Act,
which grants the SEC rulemaking authority to exempt offerings
involving $5 million or less from the Act’s registration requirements.52
In recent years, Congress has sought to further facilitate the ability of
issuers to offer and sell securities without registration by increasing the
availability and scope of exemptions. The Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act (JOBS Act)53 amended the Securities Act by adding Section
3(b)(2) and directing the SEC to update and expand the Regulation A
exemption to allow offerings of up to $50 million, a substantial increase
from the pre-existing $5 million cap.54 The SEC adopted the new
Regulation A rules in June 2015.55 The JOBS Act also added Section
4(a)(6) to the Securities Act, creating a new exemption from registration
for a type of capital raising known as “crowdfunding,” which uses the

organizations with assets exceeding $5 million, and directors, executive officers or general partners
of the issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)–(6).
49. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b), 230.502(c). Although there are no disclosure requirements in
transactions involving accredited investors, sales to unaccredited investors must meet certain
disclosure requirements set forth in Rule 502(b). 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–230.508.
50. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504.
51. Id. § 230.505.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012).
53. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
54. JOBS Act § 401. Regulation A was originally promulgated by the SEC under its Section 3(b)
authority to exempt smaller offerings of up to $5 million. However, the exemption was rarely used,
with only nineteen qualified Regulation A offerings from 2009 to 2012 for a total offering amount
of $73 million. See Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 33-9497, at 11 (Dec. 18, 2013). By
comparison, during the same time period, there were approximately 27,500 offerings of up to $5
million that were conducted under one of the Regulation D exemptions, with a total offering amount
of approximately $25 billion. Id. Under the new Section 3(b)(2) exemption, an issuer may offer and
sell up to $50 million in securities within a twelve-month period. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2).
55. As adopted, Regulation A+ provides for two tiers of offerings: Tier 1, for offerings of
securities of up to $20 million, and Tier 2, for offerings of securities of up to $50 million. Both tiers
are subject to certain basic eligibility requirements, while Tier 2 offerings are also subject to
additional disclosure and ongoing reporting requirements, including a requirement to provide
audited financial statements and file periodic reports. See Amendments for Small and Additional
Issues Exemptions under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 33-9741, at 7
(Mar. 25, 2015).
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internet to pool small individual contributions.56 The SEC promulgated
the crowdfunding rules in May 2016.57
Although exemptions from registration seek to lower the cost of
capital, there are risks associated with the accompanying reduction in the
amount of information that issuers must disclose to investors as part of
the offering process.58 Exempting small offerings from registration thus
reflects a policy tradeoff.59 On one hand, the social benefits of forcing
disclosure requirements upon small issuers appear less significant given
the minimal role these companies play in the secondary markets and in
the economy in general, while the compliance costs incurred by these
issuers are likely high.60 On the other hand, to the extent that smaller
companies present a disproportionate risk of failure and fraud,
expanding exemptions from the registration requirements for these
issuers could be particularly problematic, as it places investors at an
increased risk.61
For investors purchasing securities in offerings that are exempt from
registration, the civil liability provisions of the Securities Act, namely
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2), are unavailable. These investors, however,
may still bring a cause of action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act62 and its implementing rule, Rule 10b-5, which generally prohibits
fraud and deceptive practices “in connection with the purchase or sale of

56. JOBS Act §§ 301–02.
57. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9974, at 1 (Oct. 30, 2015).
58. See Daniel J. Morrissey, The Securities Act at Its Diamond Jubilee: Renewing the Case for a
Robust Registration Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 749, 757–59 (2009) (describing the SEC’s
objectives in requiring securities registration as protecting investors and ensuring confidence in the
integrity of the public capital markets).
59. See, e.g., Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec.,
Ins., & Inv. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement
of John C. Coates IV, Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School),
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/1d24b42e-3ef8-4653-bfe8-9c476740fafa/33A69
9FF535D59925B69836A6E068FD0.coatestestimony121411.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6TJN-AEGG]
(noting “the balance that existing securities laws and regulations have struck between the
transaction costs of raising capital . . . and the combined costs of fraud risk and asymmetric and
unverifiable information” (emphasis in original)).
60. See Carlos Berdejó, Going Public After the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 18–19 (2015)
(arguing that the optimality of mandating registration on a particular set of issuers depends on the
relative benefits and costs associated with the mandated disclosures); Michael D. Guttentag,
Accuracy Enhancement, Agency Costs, and Disclosure Regulation, 3 REV. L. AND ECON. 611, 625–
27 (2007) (arguing that requiring disclosure for larger firms may be efficient and socially desirable).
61. See Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 58 (1998) (“[R]egulators have identified small businesses as some
of the riskiest investment opportunities.”).
62. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
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any security.”63 Although the scope of the Rule 10b-5 appears to be
broader, a cause of action under this provision is more complicated for
plaintiffs relative to a Section 11 or Section 12(a)(2) claim.64
1.

Private Enforcement of Federal Laws

The causes of action available to an investor who has been defrauded
in a securities transaction will depend on whether the transaction in
question was exempt from the Securities Act’s registration requirements.
If the transaction was exempt from registration, then an investor could
have a Rule 10b-5 cause of action.65 If the transaction was not exempt
from registration and there was no effective registration statement
covering the securities, then in addition to the Rule 10b-5 claim, an
investor will be able to pursue the more straightforward Section 12(a)(1)
and rescind the transaction.66 Finally, if the transaction is not exempt
from registration and the offering was registered, in addition to the Rule
10b-5 claim, the investor may also have a Section 11 or Section 12(a)(2)
claim.67
But investors who have a valid claim under the securities laws will
not necessarily bring a lawsuit to assert their rights. From an investor’s
perspective, pursuing a claim in court can in itself be quite a risky
proposition. The fixed costs of bringing a lawsuit can be large, and a
single investor may not have the resources or economic incentives to
pursue a claim.68 If the investor does not prevail in court, not only will
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
64. To prevail in a Rule 10b-5 claim, an investor must establish a number of elements, including
a material misrepresentation or omission, scienter, reliance, and loss causation. See Erica P. John
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 809–10 (2011). On the other hand, to succeed in a
Section 11 or 12(a)(2) claim, a plaintiff only need establish the existence of a material
misrepresentation in the registration statement or prospectus. See supra notes 41–42 and
accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Selling securities without a registration statement
being in effect is a violation of Section 5(a), thus giving rise to a Section 12(a)(1) claim. See supra
note 39. This Section 12(a)(1) cause of action is independent of any potential fraudulent statement
made by the seller. See supra notes 41–42.
67. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
68. This follows if we model a plaintiff’s decision to purse a civil action as a weighing of the
costs of bringing a lawsuit and the amount of money the plaintiff expects to recover from
defendants. For an example of such a model, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private versus Public
Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 107 (1980). For a numerical example of how litigation
costs provide a disincentive to plaintiffs from filing civil suits if the amount of recovery does not
exceed the associated costs, see Alex Stein and Gideon Parchomovsky, Empowering Individual
Plaintiffs 4 (Sept. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with University of Pennsylvania Law
School Legal Scholarship Repository), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
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the investor not be compensated for their original loss, but they will also
have spent additional resources. And even if the investor prevails,
enforcing a judgment may be extremely costly if, for example, the
defendant is bankrupt, has no assets to attach, or has otherwise
absconded.69 Arguably, the costs and risks associated with bringing a
lawsuit are likely to present a more formidable barrier to investors who
have suffered relatively small losses.
The solution to this investor dilemma lies in the contingency fee and
class action mechanisms. Class actions, in which an attorney represents a
group of similarly harmed investors, can effectively spread the costs
associated with securities litigation, thus making it economically feasible
for injured investors to bring their claims in court.70 Moreover, since
attorneys representing a class are often compensated only if the class
wins (i.e., by a contingency fee), class actions also reduce the risk of
bringing a lawsuit by protecting investors from additional losses in the
event that the lawsuit is dismissed or otherwise fails.71 The merits of the
securities class action mechanism and its effectiveness in deterring fraud
and compensating its victims have been highly debated in the

=2666&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/3Y27-YVR8]. It is worth noting that the
smaller the investor’s loss, the larger attorney and court costs will be relative to the recovery that the
investor could obtain.
69. See Letter from Mary Beth Buchanan, Dir. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Gary T. Engel, Dir. Fin. Mgmt. & Assurance, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (Jan. 13,
2005), in U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-80, CRIMINAL DEBT: COURT-ORDERED
RESTITUTION AMOUNTS FAR EXCEED LIKELY COLLECTIONS FOR THE CRIME VICTIMS IN SELECTED
FINANCIAL FRAUD CASES 20–22 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/245227.pdf [https://perma.
cc/22SW-8PTU]. Even the SEC has problems collecting civil fines and disgorgements from
defendants. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION, FISCAL YEAR 2014 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, AND FISCAL YEAR 2012
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 32, 36 (2013) (noting that between 2007 and 2012, the SEC
secured $13.83 billion in civil fines and disgorgements, but collected only $7.3 billion despite
considerable efforts); Michael Rothfeld & Brad Reagan, A Maze of Paper: SEC Judgment Against
Raider Paul Bilzerian: $62 Million. Collected: $3.7 Million, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2014, 7:52 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-decades-ex-corporate-raider-holds-off-sec-effort-to-collect-62million-judgment-1410892550 [https://perma.cc/B8GP-5C82] (detailing difficulties faced by the
SEC in enforcing a monetary judgment in a high-profile case).
70. See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1466
(2004) (explaining how class actions address collective action problems confronting shareholders).
For an overview of the literature on securities class action, see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas,
Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the
Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Laws, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 164, 170 (2009).
71. See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100
CAL. L. REV. 115, 159 (2012) (noting that class action attorneys are willing to invest resources as
they are motivated by the possibility of a large contingency fee).
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literature.72 What is certainly less controversial is the proposition that
smaller issuers are relatively immune to class actions, significantly
reducing any deterrence or compensation value of such mechanism.73
The structure of attorney compensation in class actions renders these
ineffective in the context of small-scale fraud, which results in a skewed
composition of securities fraud class actions favoring cases involving
large-scale fraud.74 Securities class actions in federal court involve fraud
by large companies whose securities trade in the national stock
exchanges (and are less likely to be judgment proof); not surprisingly,
these class actions relate to frauds that are large in magnitude (which
correlates with the compensation of plaintiffs’ attorneys).75 In cases
where the aggregate amounts involved are small, the loss suffered by the
potential plaintiffs may not be sufficiently high to attract the interest of a

72. See James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on
Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 979 (1996) (“[E]mpirical results show that most
securities-fraud class actions are, in fact, frivolous.”); Choi, supra note 70, at 1477–98 (reviewing
prior studies suggesting securities class actions were often nonmeritorious); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545 (2006) (citing empirical evidence that settlements recover only a very
small share of investor losses and concluding that “[f]rom a compensatory perspective, the
conclusion seems inescapable that the securities class action performs poorly”); A.C. Pritchard,
Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Enforcers,
85 VA. L. REV. 925, 947–50 (1999) (arguing that “securities class actions are an expensive way to
reduce the social costs of fraud” and are “susceptible to overreaching by plaintiffs’ attorneys, which
means that shareholders may receive only a small percentage of their recoverable damages”).
73. See Coffee, supra note 72, at 1543 (“[T]he conventional wisdom has long been that
companies with small market capitalizations are less likely to be sued in securities class actions.”);
Bohn & Choi, supra note 72, at 936 (concluding that “smaller sized offerings hardly ever
experience a securities-fraud suit”).
74. See Pritchard, supra note 72, at 951–52 (“The contingent percentage fee also discourages
plaintiffs’ lawyers from bringing suit in cases where the damage recovery will be too small to
justify their fees, even if the evidence of fraud is strong. For this reason, companies with small
capitalizations or trading volume may be effectively immune from the threat of a class action
suit.”); Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 239 (2007)
(noting that small firms are less likely to be sued because of attorney incentives given that “the
potential recovery in a class action lawsuit involving a large firm with actively traded shares is
likely to exceed the recovery in a case involving a small firm with thinly traded stock”); Coffee,
supra note 72, at 1543 (noting that because attorney fees are related to the size of recovery, small
market capitalization companies are less likely to be sued).
75. On average, 189 securities class actions were filed in federal court each year during the period
1997–2013, of which 172 involved securities trading in the New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq.
See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 4, 24
(2015), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2014/Cornerstone-Research-SecuritiesClass-Action-Filings-2014-YIR.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWM8-JHW7]. The average change in
defendants’ market capitalization between the trading day immediately preceding the beginning of
the class period and the trading day immediately following the end of the class period was $124
billion. Id. at 6.
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plaintiff’s attorney.76 Although the precise threshold of what defines a
small company or offering is not evident, it certainly is higher than the
one for the type of small, localized fraud considered in this Article.77
2.

Public Enforcement of Federal Laws

The public sector, led by the SEC, also plays a critical role in
enforcing securities laws.78 In those cases it chooses to pursue, the SEC
may bring a civil enforcement action in federal court or commence an
administrative proceeding.79 Contested administrative proceedings are
heard by one of five SEC-appointed judges.80 When determining in
which forum to bring a case, the SEC considers a series of factors,
including the costs and expected duration of the proceedings in each
venue.81
From the SEC’s perspective, administrative actions present a number
of advantages over civil suits in federal court.82 First, administrative
actions are handled internally and entail more expedient proceedings
with less exacting evidentiary requirements, which allows the SEC to
prosecute a greater number of cases given its budgetary constraints.83
76. See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An
Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L. J. 737, 744 (2003).
77. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 511–13 (1991) (finding that none of the initial public offerings
(IPOs) in the early 1980s that had market losses under $20 million resulted in litigation); Bohn &
Choi, supra note 72, at 926–37 (finding that during the period 1975–1986 less than one percent of
IPOs with an offering amount of less than $5 million resulted in a securities class action).
78. Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act broadly authorizes the SEC to conduct investigations “to
determine whether any person has violated . . . any provision of [the Exchange Act], [or] the rules or
regulations thereunder.” Exchange Act § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (2012). See also Cox, Thomas &
Kiku, supra note 76, at 738–45 (describing the public–private partnership for the enforcement of the
U.S. securities laws); John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 229, 304 (2007) (suggesting that flaws in private securities enforcement may warrant
increased reliance on public enforcement).
79. Securities Act § 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2012); Exchange Act § 21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3.
80. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
21, 2014, 9:40 AM), http://on.wsj.com/1QpFpBz (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). SEC administrativelaw judges are appointed and paid by the agency and report to the five SEC commissioners. See
Jean Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2015, 9:25 PM),
http://on.wsj.com/1QpGV6G (last visited Apr. 30, 2017).
81. See Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Issues Guidance on Venues for Cases, WALL ST. J. (May 8,
2015, 7:06 PM), http://on.wsj.com/1QpB7u6 (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
82. See Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 76, at 749 (presenting evidence that the SEC has “a
strong preference for administrative enforcement actions”).
83. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Fights Challenges to Its In-House Courts, WALL ST. J. (June 21,
2015, 7:06 PM), http://on.wsj.com/1QpBtAK (last visited Apr. 17, 2017); Eaglesham, SEC Is
Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, supra note 80 (noting that rulings in administrative
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Second, because the administrative judges who preside over these
administrative actions have special knowledge of the securities laws and
industry, the fact-finding process can be more streamlined and
sophisticated.84 Historically, however, administrative actions did suffer a
number of significant limitations relative to civil court actions—
restrictions on the class of defendant, the type of remedies, and the range
of options regarding what to do with the funds recovered from a
defendant.85 These limitations made administrative actions less attractive
relative to civil actions.
Historically, the ability of the SEC to obtain monetary remedies as a
result of an administrative proceeding was quite limited. Prior to 1990,
the SEC could only impose civil penalties in cases involving insider
trading and certain violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,86 and
it lacked the authority to order disgorgement.87 To obtain monetary
relief, the SEC had to bring a civil action and ask the court to exercise its
equitable powers and order an “ancillary relief.”88 In 1990, Congress
substantially expanded the range of remedies that the SEC could pursue
administratively, granting the SEC the power to obtain the disgorgement
of ill-gotten gains89 and civil penalties.90 But even after the 1990

proceedings are usually handed down within 300 days of the case being filed, compared to years for
the typical federal-court case).
84. See Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, supra note 80 (quoting the
SEC enforcement chief as saying: “[w]e’re using administrative proceedings more extensively
because they offer a streamlined process with sophisticated fact finders”). However, the specialized
expertise of these judges is an open question. See Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Criticizes SEC’s In-House Court, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://on.wsj.com/
1QpCJnn (last visited Apr. 17, 2017) (citing a U.S. Chamber of Commerce report that states that
during the last thirty years, the SEC “has not hired a single [administrative law judge] who had
directly relevant experience or expertise related to the federal securities laws”).
85. For a summary of the historical development surrounding SEC administrative actions and a
description of the main differences between administrative and civil proceedings involving the SEC,
see Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Biased? An Empirical Investigation,
92 WASH. L. REV. 315, 32427 (2017).
86. See Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1103, 1113–14 (2008).
87. See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair
Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 340 (2015).
88. Id. at 339–40.
89. See Velikonja, supra note 87, at 341; U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO
SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 33 (2003), http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/sox308creport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA2V-X4MT] [hereinafter 308(C) REPORT]. To
order disgorgement, the SEC has to show that the defendant profited from the securities violation,
not just that the investor lost money due to the fraud. See SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 713 (6th Cir.
1985) (“The purpose of disgorgement is to force ‘a defendant to give up the amount by which he
was unjustly enriched’ rather than to compensate the victims of fraud.” (quoting SEC v.
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reforms, the SEC could only impose civil fines in an administrative
proceeding in actions involving regulated entities, such as broker-dealers
and investment advisors; for other entities, the SEC still needed to
pursue the case in federal court and request that the court order the
defendant to pay a civil fine.91 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 further
expanded the SEC’s authority to impose civil fines in administrative
proceedings against any entity or person.92 Anecdotal evidence suggests
that the SEC has since brought an increasing number of enforcement
actions administratively rather than in federal court.93 For example, in
2014, the SEC brought more than four out of five of its enforcement
actions as administrative proceedings, a substantial increase over the
prior decade’s rate, which was below fifty percent.94
Although penalizing the wrongdoers certainly enhances the deterrent
effect of the securities laws, it does, by itself, little for the victims who
have suffered an economic loss as a result of securities fraud. Prior to the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002,95 injured investors could
only be compensated with funds obtained by the SEC from securities
law violators through a court disgorgement order—civil penalties were
not available for compensation purposes and were transferred to the
United States Treasury.96 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorized the SEC to
add civil fines paid in enforcement actions to disgorgement funds.97
These funds, commonly referred to as “fair funds,” are established by
the SEC to compensate investors by restoring and distributing ill-gotten

Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978))); id. at 3 n.2 (“Restitution is
intended to make investors whole, and disgorgement is meant to deprive the wrongdoer of their illgotten gain.”).
90. See Winship, supra note 86, at 1114–17.
91. See Velikonja, supra note 87, at 339–40; Winship, supra note 86, at 1114–16.
92. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–65 (2010) (codified at Securities Act § 8A(g), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77h-1(g) (2012)).
93. See Gretchen Morgenson, At the S.E.C., a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-question-of-home-court-edge.html
(last visited Apr. 17, 2017) (quoting the SEC’s enforcement co-director as saying that the SEC “will
be bringing more administrative proceedings”).
94. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-House Judges, WALL. ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30
PM), http://on.wsj.com/1ff5XoH (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
95. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
96. Generally, civil fines and penalties collected by federal agencies must be remitted to the U.S.
Treasury’s general fund. See Velikonja, supra note 89, at 341–42.
97. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2012).
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gains to victims of a securities law violation.98 More recently, the DoddFrank Act authorized the SEC to distribute civil penalties to victims of
securities violations even in cases in which no disgorgement has been
ordered by a court.99 As a result, the SEC may now, at its discretion,
transfer funds obtained from (1) disgorgement and (2) civil penalties
paid by a defendant following any judicial or administrative enforcement
action to a distribution fund earmarked for injured investors.100
Though certainly investor-friendly, these recent developments are
likely to be of little help to victims of small-scale fraud. Due to limited
resources, the SEC cannot investigate all alleged securities violations
brought to its attention.101 In deciding which alleged violations to
investigate, the SEC prioritizes based on a number of factors, including
the magnitude of the potential violation and its relative harm to
investors, the deterrent effects of pursuing such action, the SEC’s
visibility in policing key areas, and the resources that would be
required.102 Some commentators have also stressed the role of politics in
the SEC’s enforcement decision-making process.103 Arguably, small and
98. See Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 76, at 754.
99. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929B, 124 Stat. 1376, 1852 (2010) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)) (amending Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)).
100. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012). See also 308(C) REPORT, supra note
89, at 4–5.
101. This concern that the SEC may not have the resources to adequately police the markets is
not new. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) (noting that
“the securities markets have grown dramatically in size and complexity, while [SEC] enforcement
resources have declined” and that the SEC “does not have the resources to police the [securities]
industry sufficiently”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This has become a bigger
issue in an era of government downsizing and increased reliance on the SEC. See Jill E. Fisch, Class
Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 555 (1997) (“Concerns
about limiting the size of government and political pressure to reduce expenditures on public
enforcement support increased reliance on private enforcement.”).
102. See Human Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at SEC and Key Trade Agencies:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt., Restructuring & the Dist. of Columbia
of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 6 (2002) (statement of Richard J. Hillman,
Director of Financial Markets and Community Involvement, General Accounting Office, and Loren
Yager, Director of International Affairs and Trade, General Accounting Office) (“[The] SEC
generally prioritizes the cases in terms of (1) the message delivered to the industry and public about
the reach of SEC’s enforcement efforts, (2) the amount of investor harm done, (3) the deterrent
value of the action, and (4) SEC’s visibility in certain areas such as insider trading and financial
fraud.”); DIV. OF ENF’T, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, ENF’T MANUAL 4–5 (2015) (listing factors and
considerations to be taken into account when prioritizing investigations); Cox, Thomas & Kiku,
supra note 76, at 759 (“[T]he SEC gauges its enforcement priorities by the message the action sends
to the industry and public, the relative harm to investors, the deterrent effects of the action, and the
visibility the SEC enjoys in combating such abuses.”).
103. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 72, at 1018 (“Politicians happily provide the SEC whatever
tools it deems necessary to fight insider trading and the SEC cultivates political support through its
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local instances of fraud are less likely to be highly ranked under either
metric. Not surprisingly, issuers subject to SEC enforcement actions are
relatively large and so are the amounts of monetary losses involved.104
Moreover, the fixed costs associated with establishing a fair fund and the
administrative costs involved in designing and implementing a
distribution plan (e.g., locating the victims to be compensated) make
restitution impractical in cases where the amounts of money to be
distributed are small.105
B.

State Regulation of the Securities Markets

Transactions involving securities are also subject to regulation at the
state level.106 Most of the state securities statutes are based on a version
of the Uniform Securities Act, a model code which largely tracks the
federal regulatory approach described above.107 As under the Securities
Act, sales of securities in a state must either be registered or fall within
an exemption from registration under the state’s securities law.108 State
securities statutes also contain civil liability provisions that mirror their
insider trading enforcement regime. But this strict enforcement comes at a cost, as even trivial
insider trading cases are prosecuted. Such prosecutions may chill market investigation and impose
substantial opportunity costs while other frauds go unprosecuted.”); Urska Velikonja, Politics in
Securities Enforcement, 50 GA. L. REV. 17, 19 (2015) (“[W]hile politics is largely irrelevant at the
individual case level, political influences do shape [the SEC’s] enforcement choices at the aggregate
level.”).
104. The average market capitalization of respondent companies in a 2003 study of SEC
enforcement actions was $1.1 billion. See Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 76, at 765. In the same
study, the average settlement was $9.8 million. See id. at 764. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics Inflation Calculator, as of May 16, 2017, in 2016 dollars these figures are $1.4 billion and
$12.8 million, respectively. This inflation calculator is available at CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.
htm [https://perma.cc/JF86-MBZV].
105. See 308(C) REPORT, supra note 89, at 14 (noting that compensating investors “is not always
economically feasible”); Velikonja, supra note 89, at 351. The average size of the 243 fair funds
established by the SEC between 2002 and 2013 was $59.5 million dollars, with the median fund
distributing $16.5 million. See id. at 352.
106. All fifty states have adopted securities statutes, commonly referred to as blue-sky laws. See
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 41 (3d ed., rev. 1998).
107. At least forty states have adopted some version of the Uniform Securities Act. See LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 106, at 42. A few notable states, California, Texas, New York, and Florida,
have securities statutes that deviate from the Uniform Securities Act. Id. at 34 n.39.
108. See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 301 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
1956) (providing that “[i]t is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless
(1) it is registered under this act or (2) the security or transaction is exempted under section 402”);
see also Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory
Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (1987) (“Every state securities act, like the 1933 Act,
requires every sale of securities in the state to be either registered or exempt from registration.”).
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federal counterpart and grant investors a cause of action against
promoters and issuers that sell securities without registration or who,
more generally, employ fraudulent schemes in the offer and sale of
securities.109
1.

The Federal-State Partnership

Although the ineffectiveness of state law in preventing fraud was one
of the driving forces behind the enactment of the federal securities laws
in the 1930s,110 the latter were intended, at least originally, to
complement rather than replace existing state laws.111 This dual
regulatory system lasted well into the 1990s,112 when the federal
government enacted the National Securities Market Improvement Act
(NSMIA).113 NSMIA prohibits states from enforcing their registration
requirements for offerings of “covered securities,” a term which includes
securities listed on a national exchange or offered in Rule 506 private
placements, among others.114 NSMIA sought to reduce the cost of
capital for issuers, which previously had to comply not only with all

109. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 509(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
2002) (granting rescissory rights to investors who purchase from someone who sold a security “in
violation of Section 301 [the Act’s registration provision] or, by means of an untrue statement of a
material fact”). Moreover, the general anti-fraud provisions of the Uniform Securities Act which
grant standing to public enforcers are substantially based on Rule 10b-5. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101
cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1956). (This section “is
substantially the [SEC’s Rule 10B-5]”); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 501 cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002) (“Section 501, which was Section 101 in the 1956 Act, was
modeled after Rule 10b-5 . . . .”); LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 106, at 42.
110. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 20 (4th ed. 2002). Prior to
the enactment of the Securities Act, transactions in securities were exclusively the domain of state
law. Kansas adopted the first blue-sky statute in 1911, and by the time Congress adopted the
Securities Act every state except Nevada had a securities law. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note
106, at 36–40.
111. See Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 112 (2005). The Securities Act and the Exchange Act both
contain savings clauses, preserving the continued viability of state securities statutes. See Securities
Act § 18(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (2012); Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2012).
112. See Jones, supra note 111, at 112–14; Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Insidious Remnants
of State Rules Respecting Capital Formation, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 407, 411–13 (2000).
113. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 11 Stat. 3416 (1996); Securities Act of 1933 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r(a).
114. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case
Against Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495, 515–24 (1984); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections
on Dual Regulations of Securities: A Case for Reallocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 500–04 (2000).
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existing federal requirements, but also with the registration requirements
of every state in which they offered and sold securities.115
The merits of NSMIA have been extensively debated, with critics
arguing that the broad nature of the statute left a significant portion of
the securities markets virtually unregulated both at the federal and state
levels.116 In an unregulated marketplace for private offerings where the
screening and informational functions of registration requirements are
absent, retail investors can become easy prey for unscrupulous
promoters.117 Moreover, to the extent that smaller companies present a
disproportionate risk of failure and fraud, expanding exemptions to the
registration requirements for these issuers can be particularly
problematic.118 In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that after the
enactment of NSMIA, fraudulent transactions involving Rule 506
offerings became more prevalent.119 To the extent that small, local

115. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Blackhole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L.
151, 156–58 (2010) (examining legislative history of NSMIA).
116. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Fleecing Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, 16 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 993, 995 (2012) (“Private offerings largely escape both federal and state regulatory
scrutiny.”); Johnson, supra note 115, at 154–55 (“NSMIA’s preemption of state regulation of
private placements, therefore, created a regulatory black hole—today, no one regulates these
offerings.”).
117. See Johnson, supra note 115, at 152 (“Many investors, including vulnerable senior citizens,
are victimized each year in dubious securities offerings . . . . Most promoters involved in these
questionable investment schemes sell securities pursuant to the so-called private placement
exemption of the federal securities law.”); Letter from Joseph P. Borg, President, NASAA, and Dir.,
Ala. Sec. Comm’n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 4, 2002),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72301/borg1.htm [https://perma.cc/8TYH-JEWD] (“States
frequently use violations of their registration provisions as the basis for stopping fraud. A state
regulator can issue a cease and desist order or obtain a preliminary injunction by simply proving the
existence of a security and the absence of an effective registration statement. Were the states,
because of preemption, unable to use this tool, they would have to devote substantial time and effort
to prove fraud, which prolongs the public’s exposure to harm and further taxes limited state
resources.”).
118. See supra note 61.
119. See, e.g., Fred Joseph, Colo. Sec. Comm’r, President, North American Securities
Administrators Association, News Conference Opening Statement at the National Press Club: An
Agenda for Change: How the 111th Congress Can Better Protect Investors (Jan. 29, 2009),
http://www.nasaa.org/402/an-agenda-for-change-how-the-111th-congress-can-better-protectinvestors/ [https://perma.cc/5W9T-2F35] (stating that Rule 506 offerings have become the favorite
Regulation D offering and that many of them are fraudulent); Enhancing Investor Protection and
the Regulation of Securities Markets—Part 2: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Fred J. Joseph, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs
Ass’n) (noting that since NSMIA was enacted, state regulators have witnessed a steady and
significant rise in the number of fraudulent Rule 506 offerings); Johnson, supra note 115, at 188
(noting that the Rule 506 offering has become “a favorite vehicle for fraudulent transactions”);
Johnson, Fleecing Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, supra note 116, at 999–1000 (describing
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securities offerings are more likely to fly under the regulators’ radar and
involve less experienced and naive investors, one can safely assume that
fraud is likely to be even more pervasive in these offerings.120
Federal preemption has historically been a contentious issue for state
regulators because “[m]any of the segments of the market that have been
deregulated and that serve small and early-stage issuers involve
significant investment risk and fraud.”121 Recently, this tension came to
light during the Regulation A rulemaking process.122 The final
Regulation A rules provide for the preemption of state securities law
registration requirements for securities offered or sold in “Tier 2”
offerings to “qualified purchasers,” a term broadly defined to include all
offerees and purchasers in such offerings.123 At the time this provision
was proposed, the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA) strongly objected to this preemption of state law,
questioning whether the proposed definition of “qualified purchaser”
was consistent with the public interest and the investor protection
standards of NSMIA.124 Individual state regulators also criticized
Regulation A+’s preemption of state regulation. William F. Galvin,
Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, noted:
We are dismayed and shocked to see that the [SEC’s]
the example of MedCap, which hired stockbrokers to sell over $2 billion of promissory notes to
20,000 retail investors in a series of private placements).
120. Moreover, given the diminished responsibility for state administrators in the ex ante
regulation of offerings, one could arguably expect decreases in the resources and expertise invested
into screening of small securities offerings to ensure that state registration requirements are being
followed and that no fraudulent schemes are being carried out.
121. Letter from William F. Galvin, Sec’y of the Commonwealth, Commonwealth of Mass., to
U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n 2 (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s711131.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PTS-MPSU] [hereinafter Galvin Letter].
122. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
123. See Securities Act Release No. 33-9741, supra note 55, at 206–07. Tier 1 offerings will be
subject to federal and state registration and qualification requirements, and issuers may take
advantage of the coordinated review program developed by the North American Securities
Administrators Association. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
124. Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, NASAA, to Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n 1 (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/NASAA-LetterRegarding-Reg-A+_021914.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4TY-AYGQ] [hereinafter Galvin Letter] (noting
that state securities administrators “cannot do [their] job – protect investors or help small businesses
access capital and grow their companies – where the Commission attempts to prohibit [their]
review”). This letter also made a plea for cooperation between federal and state regulators as an
alternative to preemption, and highlighted other alternatives such as NASAA’s new coordinated,
streamlined multi-state review program. Id. at 1–2 (“There is no doubt in our minds that the
Commission and the states, standing together, will be much more effective in protecting our citizens
and making Regulation A+ a success for small business filers than we could ever hope to be
standing apart.”).
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Regulation [A+] proposal includes provisions that preempt the
ability of the states to require registration of these offerings and
to review them. The states have tackled preemption battles on
many fronts, but never before have we found ourselves battling
our federal counterpart. Shame on the SEC for this anti-investor
proposal. This is a step that puts small retail investors
unacceptably at risk. We urge the [SEC] to remove these
provisions from the rule.
Because many Regulation [A+] offerings will be made by small
and early-stage issuers, they will involve significant risks. That
makes these offerings a worrisome choice for small retail
investors. Moreover, offerings made under the current
Regulation A very often have a local character. If that pattern
continues, Regulation [A+] offerings will also be sold
substantially in the issuers’ home states and in local-area
markets. For this reason alone, it is crucial for the states to have
a role in overseeing these offerings in order to protect their
citizens.125
This preemption battle did not end with the final adoption of the
revised Regulation A+ rules. The securities regulators of Montana and
Massachusetts filed suit in federal court objecting to and challenging the
SEC’s definition of “qualified purchaser” and to the federal preemption
of state law in Regulation A+ offerings.126 In their brief, the state
administrators also argued that the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis was
flawed and that state laws policed by regulators with local knowledge
could do more than the SEC to lessen the risks and costs of fraud.127
2.

Enforcement at the State Level

Although NSMIA limits the role of state regulation with respect to the
registration of securities, it does not impair a state’s ability to enforce its
securities fraud statutes, whether judicially or administratively.128 In
125. Galvin Letter, supra note 121, at 1–2.
126. Opening Brief of Petitioners at 25–26, Lindeen v. SEC, No. 15-1149 & Galvin v. SEC, No.
15-1150 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 2015).
127. Id. at 27.
128. Securities Act § 18(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (2012); see also Manning Gilbert Warren
III, Federalism and Investor Protection: Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies
for Securities Fraud, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 176 (1997); Jones, supra note 111, at 114–
15. NSMIA expressly preserved the authority of states to investigate and bring enforcement actions
with respect to fraudulent or deceptive practices. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (“Consistent with this
section, the securities commission . . . of any State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such
State to investigate and bring enforcement actions, in connection with securities or securities
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recent years, much attention has been devoted to the effectiveness of a
system where state and federal actors have co-existing enforcement
powers to investigate and prosecute fraud.129 This debate gained
renewed attention following the increased role played by state regulators
at the turn of the millennium in pursuing cases of national importance,
the type one would expect to be pursued by federal regulators.130
On one hand, state enforcement can play a key role in deterring
untoward behavior in the national securities markets by bringing
enforcement actions in cases that federal regulators should pursue but do
not as a result of budgetary constraints131 or lax enforcement policies.132
However, one may be concerned about the efficiency of having
concurrent investigations and the potential duplication of enforcement
costs—existing studies suggest that state actions target firms in the
financial sector on an industry-wide basis, significantly overlapping with

transactions . . . with respect to . . . fraud or deceit.”); Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer
Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2175
(2010) (“[I]n addition to facing federal fraud liability at the hands of both the SEC and class action
plaintiffs, participants in the U.S. national securities markets also face potential fraud liability at the
hands of fifty state governments.”).
129. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 111, at 117–21; Rose, supra note 128, at 2205–10 (arguing for
federal government to have sole responsibility for deterring fraud at the national level).
130. See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws,
100 CAL. L. REV. 115, 157 (2012) (noting the New York Attorney General’s enforcement actions of
the 2000s against research analysts and the mutual fund industry); Amanda M. Rose, State
Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm),
97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1377 (2013) (“The wisdom of preserving a concurrent state securities fraud
enforcement role vis-à-vis nationally traded firms has been hotly debated for over a decade now.”).
131. See generally Strategic Planning, Resource Allocation and Crisis Management—Is the SEC
Ready?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Efficiency and Fin. Mgmt. of the Comm. on Gov’t
Reform, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (2004) (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Director of Financial
Markets and Community Investment, U.S. General Accounting Office). See also Mark Maremont &
Deborah Solomon, Missed Chances: Behind SEC’s Failings: Caution, Tight Budget, ‘90s
Exuberance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2003, at A1 (exploring the reasons for the SEC’s recent failures
in securities enforcement); Jones, supra note 111, at 126–27 (“Because the SEC lacks adequate
resources to effectively police the national securities market, supplemental enforcement is essential
to achieve an appropriate level of deterrence.”).
132. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 885–88 (2006)
(explaining how overlapping state–federal jurisdiction can help overcome regulatory inertia by
creating a “fail-safe” system of redundancy that protects against under-regulation); John C. Coffee,
Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV.
707, 763–66 (2009) (noting that state regulators have incentives to prosecute fraud, are more
stringent than the SEC, and often are faster than the SEC in investigating and prosecuting fraud); Jill
E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 798 (2009) (“[R]ecent
and continuing history of securities-related scandals and SEC failures offers little reason to cut back
even minimally on state enforcement efforts.”); Rose, supra note 130, at 1348, 1361.
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SEC investigations.133 Moreover, since state administrators are subject to
political pressure, they may cater to their constituents by investigating
unpopular companies or using the threat of criminal sanctions to extort
civil settlements.134
Though the merits of state involvement in investigating and
prosecuting securities violations that are “national” in character are
debatable, there is greater consensus about the positive aspects of
concurrent jurisdiction in enforcement at the local level. Setting aside
the resource constraints the SEC faces,135 a state enforcer is likely to
enjoy a comparative advantage relative to its federal counterparts in
investigating small, local fraud.136 State enforcers, for example, are
likely to have a better understanding of local conditions and have better
access to the information necessary to detect instances of fraud and
pursue a case against securities laws violators.137 Not surprisingly, state

133. See Amanda M. Rose & Larry J. LeBlanc, Policing Public Companies: An Empirical
Examination of the Enforcement Landscape and the Role Played by State Securities Regulators, 65
FLA. L. REV. 395, 396, 399 (2013) (finding that for U.S. companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, state securities enforcement actions target mostly firms in the financial sector and
misconduct implicating an industry-wide scandal, rather than firm-specific misbehavior, and that
over ninety percent of these state actions were accompanied by a related federal action or
investigation).
134. See, e.g., Christopher R. Lane, Halting the March Toward Preemption: Resolving Conflicts
Between State and Federal Securities Regulators, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 317, 339 (2005) (asserting
that “Oklahoma . . . dropped criminal securities fraud charges against WorldCom in return for a
promise by the company to create 1600 jobs in the state over the next ten years”); Park, supra note
130, at 158–59; Rose, supra note 130, at 1403–06, 1411 (describing rent-seeking behavior of West
Virginia’s securities regulators); Rose, supra note 130, at 1409–11 (finding that while some state
actions against nationally traded firms have served to discipline the SEC, others can be
characterized as rent-seeking). It is worth noting that the SEC is not necessarily immune from
political pressure. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
135. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 58 (2010) (“State AGs can . . . serve a valuable equalizing function by bringing
enforcement actions when a federal agency shares the state’s outlook on regulation but lacks the
resources to police all infractions.”); Johnson, supra note 115, at 195–96 (noting that the SEC lacks
the resources to “police smaller private placements” and arguing that smaller private offerings
should be “policed at the local level”).
136. See Rose, supra note 130, at 1372 (“[A] federal enforcer might take the enforcement lead
when it enjoys a comparative enforcement advantage relative to a state enforcer (such as a better
ability to investigate crimes with a multistate dimension), and a state enforcer might step in when it
has an advantage over the federal enforcer (such as when most of the witnesses and evidence are
located within the state).”); Rose, supra note 128, at 2206 (“This formulation supports assigning the
federal government responsibility for deterring fraud in the national securities markets, while
assigning state governments responsibility for deterring fraud targeted at their respective local
capital markets.”).
137. See Rose, supra note 130, at 1357–58; Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal
Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 721 (2011) (observing that “[s]tates may have an investigatory or
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regulators have historically focused their enforcement efforts on local,
small-time fraud, while the SEC has tackled the bigger cases that touch
the national markets.138
II.

RECENT INNOVATIONS AT THE STATE LEVEL

As highlighted in the prior section, the expansion of the universe of
offerings that are exempt from registration at the federal level has left
investors in small and local securities offerings outside the reach of the
federal securities laws’ ex ante protective mechanisms. And, even
though the general anti-fraud provisions of Rule 10b-5 apply to these
transactions, in practice, the two principal mechanisms of ex post
enforcement—private securities litigation and SEC enforcement
actions—play a limited role in policing offerings that are small and local
in nature. Complicating matters further for small investors, federal law
has increasingly preempted the states’ ability to regulate the offering
process.
In light of these developments, states have focused their efforts on ex
post (e.g., enforcement) rather than ex ante (e.g., registration)
mechanisms to protect investors from securities fraud. To strengthen
these ex post enforcement mechanisms in the past few decades, several
states have expanded the authority of state securities administrators to
obtain restitution on behalf of injured investors in civil actions, as well
as in administrative proceedings.139 More recently, some states have
established innovative insurance-type restitution funds that provide
partial compensation to victims of securities fraud.140 This section
identifies and explains these two recent innovations and provides an
economic analysis of their policy implications.

enforcement apparatus in place . . . that would be costly for the federal government to replicate” and
explaining that state enforcers “are likely to have a better understanding of local conditions than
their federal counterparts, simply by virtue of living and working in the state”); NASAA to Obama:
Limiting Preemption Protects Investors, NASAA INSIGHT (N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Wash.,
D.C.), Spring/Summer 2009, at 1, http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/NASAA
_Insight_Spring_Summer_2009_Online.pdf [https://perma.cc/47NK-HPVM] (stressing the role of
state regulators in fraud detection given their “unique proximity to investors and to the industry
participants within their state borders”) (quoting NASAA President and Colorado Sec. Comm’r.
Fred Joseph).
138. See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 279 (1998) (describing state regulators as “a local cop on
the beat” with a “traditional consumer protection role”).
139. See infra section II.A.1.
140. See infra section II.B.1.
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Expansion of Enforcement Powers of Securities Administrators

The first major innovation or trend at the state level which holds
potential for investor protection is state administrative enforcement.
Although federal legislation has restricted the states’ ability to regulate
the registration and qualification of securities prior to their sale, the
authority and power of state securities administrators to police and
investigate fraud, including the type of remedies that the administrator
may seek to obtain (e.g., restitution or disgorgement) and the forum in
which it may do so (e.g., civil court or administrative proceeding), are
determined by state law.141 These represent significant levers for states
to deter and punish fraud. As the discussion below illustrates, states have
increasingly taken advantage of these levers by expanding the ex post
enforcement powers of securities administrators.
1.

Historical Development

The Uniform Securities Act of 1956 (USA (1956)) afforded
administrators limited statutory power to pursue civil or administrative
actions against violators of a state’s securities laws.142 The original text
itself did not even authorize the administrator to issue a cease-and-desist
order; rather, the administrator had to file a civil action in state court to
obtain any type of injunctive relief against violations of the state
securities laws.143 And such injunctive relief was the only remedy the
administrator could obtain in a civil action—state securities
administrators lacked the authority to bring a lawsuit in civil court

141. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. Investigations by securities administrators can
lead to three possible outcomes: a criminal action, a civil action, or an administrative proceeding.
See ALAN R. BROMBERG, LEWIS D. LOWENFELS & MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, 6 BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD §§ 12:240-242 (2d ed. 2015).
142. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 603, cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
1985). The original text from 1956 reads as follows:
Whenever it appears to the [Administrator] that any person has engaged or is about to engage
in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of this act or any rule or order
hereunder, [he] may in [his] discretion bring an action in the [insert name of appropriate court]
to enjoin the acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this act or any rule or order
hereunder. Upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or
writ of mandamus shall be granted and a receiver or conservator may be appointed for the
defendant or the defendant’s assets. The court may not require the [Administrator] to post a
bond.
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 408 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1956); Blue Sky
L. Rep. P¶ 5548 (C.C.H.), 2009 WL 2996912.
143. See BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 141, § 12:241.
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against those violating the securities laws to obtain civil penalties or any
other ancillary relief, including restitution for the victims. 144
In the decades following the drafting of USA (1956), several states
that adopted the model act expanded the ability of their securities
administrators to pursue remedies against securities laws violators by
authorizing them to sue in civil court to obtain civil penalties or even
restitution on behalf of injured investors.145 The text of the subsequent
model code, the Uniform Securities Act of 1985 (USA (1985)), reflected
this trend. Under USA (1985), a state securities administrator may file a
civil action and obtain a court ordered civil penalty, as well as restitution
for injured investors or any other remedy the court considers just.146
Currently, there are forty-three states that allow their securities
administrators to file civil suits seeking restitution or disgorgement on
behalf of injured investors.147
The ability of state securities administrators to employ administrative
actions as a vehicle to police and investigate fraud has also been
enhanced in recent years. Under the original text of USA (1956), state
securities administrators did not even have the authority to issue a ceaseand-desist order as the result of an administrative proceeding.148 As with
the range of remedies available to securities administrators in civil
actions, several states experimented with further expanding the authority
of their securities administrators by granting them the power to issue
cease-and-desist orders in administrative proceedings.149 By the time

144. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 603 cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
2002).
145. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 59.255(4)(a) (2015) (court may award “if the court finds that
enforcement of the rights of such persons by private civil action, whether by class action or
otherwise, would be so burdensome or expensive as to be impractical”); 70 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1-509(b) (West 2014) (similar); and WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.390(4) (1974)
(similar).
146. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 603(a)(1) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
1985). A 1987 amendment to the USA (1956) enhanced the powers of securities administrators and
expanded the remedies administrators may pursue in civil court against persons who have engaged
in violations of the securities laws to include “an order of rescission, restitution or disgorgement.”
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 408(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1956) (as
amended). See Blue Sky L. Rep. P¶ 5548 (C.C.H.), 2009 WL 2996912.
147. See infra Table 1.
148. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., CALIF. CORP. CODE § 25532(a) (2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.221(1) (West
2009). In addition, administrative proceedings can result in denial, suspension, or revocation of a
broker-dealer or investment adviser license or of a registration of securities. See BROMBERG ET AL.,
supra note 141, § 12:240.
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USA (1985) was drafted,150 a large number of state securities
administrators had the authority to issue cease-and-desist orders, either
by amendment to their state’s USA (1956) version or through the
corresponding state’s administrative procedure law.151 Reflecting the
legislative trend at the time,152 USA (1985) empowered administrators to
issue cease-and-desist orders153 and granted them the authority to impose
civil penalties, subject to statutory ceilings.154 The most recent model
act, the Uniform Securities Act of 2002 (USA (2002)) tracked these
developments.155 Like USA (1985), USA (2002) allows state securities
administrators to file a civil action to obtain civil penalties, restitution, or
other relief as the court considers appropriate, including rescission and
disgorgement.156 Under USA (2002), the state securities administrator

150. Highlighting the increasing authority of administrators, USA (1985) contains two different
sections: one dealing with administrative remedies and one dealing with civil remedies. See UNIF.
SEC. ACT §§ 602, 603 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1985). These two
sections replaced a single section in USA (1956). See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 408 (NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1956).
151. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 602, cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
1985). However, most state securities administrators lacked the authority to impose civil penalties.
Id.
152. USA (1985) sought to increase the administrative remedies available to administrators to
provide them greater flexibility in imposing sanctions. See id.
153. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 602(b)(1). While USA (1956) was adopted by 37 states, few adopted USA
(1985). See Joel Seligman, The New Uniform Securities Act, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 243 (2003);
Richard B. Smith, A New Uniform Securities Act, 6 No. 9 GLWSLAW 8, at 2 (Westlaw) (Feb.
2003). Currently, only four states have a version of USA (1985) in effect. See Legislative Enactment
Status
Securities
Act,
UNIFORM
L.
COMMISSION
(1988),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=
Securities%20Act%20
[https://perma.cc/PK8Z-UHH9].
154. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 604(d). Under USA (1985), the securities administrator may impose a
civil penalty of up to $2,500 for a single violation or $25,000 for multiple violations in one or more
related proceedings. Id. § 602(b)(4). The maximum amounts, however, vary by state. See, e.g., N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:23 (2015) ($2,500 per violation and $5,000 aggregate); WIS. STATS. §
551.603(2)(b)(3) (2016) ($5,000 per violation and $250,000 aggregate); MO. REV. STAT. § 409.6603 (2016) ($10,000 per violation and $1,000,000 aggregate).
155. To date, nineteen jurisdictions have adopted USA (2002). See Legislative Fact Sheet
Securities Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?
title=Securities%20Act [https://perma.cc/PNK3-NKSQ].
156. UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 603(b)(2)(C), (b)(3). According to the drafters of the model act, section
603 follows USA (1985) in “broadening the civil remedies available when the administrator
believes that a violation has occurred” in order to “enable administrators to better tailor appropriate
sanctions to particular misconduct.” § 603 cmt. 1.
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may also issue cease-and-desist orders157 or, following an administrative
hearing, impose a civil penalty.158
Although USA (1985) and USA (2002) expanded the remedies that
securities administrators could pursue in administrative proceedings,
such remedies were still more limited than those that a court could
impose upon request by the administrator.159 Notably, although the state
securities administrator could impose a civil fine as a result of an
administrative proceeding, it could not order restitution on behalf of an
injured investor (although it could request a court to do so in a civil
case).160 In recent years, a number of states have amended their laws on
an individual basis to empower their securities administrators to issue
orders requiring defendants to pay restitution.161 States began to
empower their administrators in this manner during the late 1980s and
with time, more states amended their laws to grant this authority to their
securities administrators.162 There are now twenty-one states that have
authorized their securities administrators to order restitution as a result
of an administrative proceeding.163
2.

Economic Assessment

a.

Policy Implications

One of the policy trends identified above is the increase in the amount
of monetary damages (whether in the form of civil penalties or a
restitution order) that state securities administrators may obtain in civil
and administrative actions against violators of the state’s securities laws.
This increase should incentivize an administrator to investigate a greater
number of securities fraud cases.164

157. § 604(a)(1).
158. § 604(d). The administrator may also charge the costs associated with the investigation and
proceedings in the final order. § 604(e).
159. See supra notes 14647, 15254, 15658 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 15658 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 16263 and accompanying text.
162. Arizona made the corresponding amendment to its securities laws in 1986. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. Ch. 220, § 5 (1986). Delaware and Massachusetts followed suit in 1990 and 1991,
respectively. See Delaware Laws Ch. 274, H.B. No. 444 (1990) and 1991 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch.
490 (H.B. 3354).
163. See infra Table 1. The latest state to have amended its laws to this end was California in
2013. 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2660(4) (S.B. 538).
164. This conclusion follows if the benefits that the administrator may obtain from commencing
an action have increased by an amount larger than any increase in the costs that the administrator
would have to incur to secure those additional benefits. For an overview of administrators’ incentive
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From society’s perspective, an increase in the number of actions
pursued by state administrators presents benefits as well as costs. An
increase in both the size and probability of a potential penalty could, at
the margin, deter a greater number of fraudsters from violating the
securities laws.165 Moreover, in those instances where fraud is not
deterred, investors may be more likely to receive some compensation for
their losses, at least in the states that allow the securities administrator to
collect damages on their behalf.166 But there are also potential costs that
should be considered. Not only will the administrator have to spend
more resources in commencing and pursuing those additional actions,
but those accused of violating the securities laws will also incur costs in
establishing their defense. And maintaining the forum in which such
actions, whether judicial (civil courts) or administrative (administrative
courts), are resolved is costly as well.167 These social costs would be
exacerbated if the administrator has the incentive to bring numerous or
unmeritorious actions that are politically motivated, as this could have a
chilling effect on capital formation for smaller companies.168
The second, and more notable, trend identified above is the increase
in the remedies that state securities administrators may pursue in
administrative proceedings. Historically, administrators could only
obtain certain types of monetary damages, such as disgorgement and
fines in civil actions; however, in recent years more states have allowed
administrators to recover these type of damages in administrative
actions.169 If pursuing a case administratively is more cost-effective and
less time-consuming than pursuing a similar case in state court, the
bridging of this gap should lead to a higher number of civil and
administrative actions pursued by securities administrators.170 First,

to seek monetary penalties, see Margaret H. Lemos and Max Minzner, For-Profit Public
Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 856–57 (2014) (arguing that public enforcement agencies
may seek higher monetary penalties to further deterrence, enhance the administrator’s reputation, or
supplement the agency’s budget when allowed to retain the recovered funds).
165. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
166. For a description of existing investor compensation programs, see infra section II.B.1.b and
section II.B.1.c.
167. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
168. If the state administrator is subject to political pressure it may have the incentive to bring
numerous actions to increase its prestige or bring meritless suits in the hopes that the defendant
chooses to settle to avoid a costly proceeding. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 14858 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 9495 and accompanying text. This effect will be even stronger if securities
administrators believe that they have a higher probability of success in administrative actions
compared to civil actions. See supra notes 8284 and accompanying text.

05 - Berdejo.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

SMALL INVESTMENTS, BIG LOSSES

5/28/2017 1:51 PM

599

instead of bringing a particular case in state court, the administrator may
choose instead to pursue that case in an administrative proceeding.
Second, there may be cases that the administrator does not find
economically justifiable to bring in state court, but that may now be
economically feasible to pursue in an administrative proceeding.171
By increasing the likelihood of a wrongdoer receiving a penalty, such
additional actions could enhance the deterrent effect of the securities
laws. Moreover, in the cases in which restitution is ordered, victims are
also more likely to receive compensation. Thus, at a first glance,
enhancing the authority of state administrators in this manner appears to
promote the goals of deterrence and compensation. There are, however,
potential monetary and non-monetary costs associated with such
increased use of administrative proceedings, which are discussed next.
b.

Lessons from the SEC’s Recent Experience

The growing ability of state administrators to seek ancillary remedies
in civil court, and more recently, to order restitution in administrative
proceedings, parallels the rising role of SEC administrative actions in
securities law enforcement at the federal level.172 These recent
developments at the federal level can provide valuable insights as to the
likely results of such expansion of administrative power at the state
level. The SEC’s response to the expansion of its administrative powers
does suggest that state administrators are likely to bring an increasing
number of administrative actions.173 Moreover, the SEC’s experience
also highlights two potential concerns associated with such increased
frequency in administrative actions: (1) monetary costs associated with
maintaining administrative courts, and (2) the perception of fairness in
administrative proceedings.
Although the costs for the SEC to bring an action in an administrative
court may be lower, maintaining that specialized administrative court in
the first place is expensive; and to preserve the quality and expediency
of the system, the number of judges needs to increase in tandem with a
171. See Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An
Empirical Assessment, 34 YALE J. REG. 1, 25–31 (2017).
172. See supra notes 86100 and accompanying text. More generally, these developments also
touch upon the growing literature analyzing large-scale compensation efforts by federal
administrative agencies and state attorney generals. See, e.g., Velikonja, supra note 89, at 337–38;
Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1992, 201314 (2012); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500,
527 (2011).
173. See supra notes 9394 and accompanying text.
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growing caseload.174 Given the volume of the SEC’s workload, those
costs may be reasonable. This calculus, however, may be different for
individual states with a lighter workload that may not justify the fixed
costs associated with maintaining a specialized court.175 Thus, even if
state securities administrators would enjoy the same benefits associated
with administrative proceedings, one may be concerned whether they
would be able to find the personnel to staff such a specialized court and
whether the costs of operating such courts would be prohibitive (or at
least offset any efficiency gains). Of course, states do not need to have
specialized securities courts and could employ the more general
administrative courts established under the states’ administrative
procedure acts. But then, some of the benefits associated with
administrative proceedings would not be fully enjoyed.
Another open question is the extent to which administrative
proceedings can be fair to defendants, an issue that has led a number of
defendants to challenge in federal court the decisions by the SEC to
pursue actions against them before an administrative judge.176
Defendants have argued that administrative actions unfairly deny them
important protections afforded by the federal courts and have questioned
the relative fairness of the system, noting that SEC judges appear biased
toward the agency.177 Not only are judges appointed by the SEC, but
they have their offices in the SEC headquarters, which exposes them to

174. During the year 2014, the SEC added two new administrative law judges, bringing the
number of judges at the time to five. Moreover, for the fiscal year 2015 the budget for the
administrative law judge’s office rose forty-four percent to $2.5 million. See Eaglesham, supra note
94.
175. Even though bringing an administrative action appears to be more economical than a civil
suit from the administrator’s perspective, those savings may be offset by the higher costs associated
with maintaining the administrative court relative to just increasing the capacity of the existing civil
court system.
176. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, Federal Judge Deals Another Blow to SEC Administrative Court,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2015), http://on.wsj.com/1QpGmtE [https://perma.cc/8K96-K5GF]
(describing a Georgia federal court decision); Jean Eaglesham, Federal Judge Rules SEC In-House
Judges ‘Likely Unconstitutional’, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2015), http://on.wsj.com/1QpGHwn
[https://perma.cc/QA8K-GKGY] (describing a New York federal court decision); Jean Eaglesham,
Judge Adds to Pressure on SEC over How It Names Its Judges, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2015),
http://on.wsj.com/1QpDjld [https://perma.cc/5MC5-ZEJC] (describing a New York federal court
decision).
177. See Eaglesham, The SEC Fights Challenges to Its In-House Courts, supra note 83. Thus far,
these challenges have met with little success at the appellate level. See Aruna Viswanatha, Appeals
Court Upholds SEC’s In-House Court as Constitutional, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/appeals-court-upholds-secs-in-house-court-as-constitutional1470766508 [https://perma.cc/P34X-YFFV].
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pressure and raises questions regarding the judges’ objectivity.178
Moreover, appeals of rulings rendered by the SEC’s administrative law
judges are heard by the five SEC Commissioners and reversals are not
common.179 It is hard to assess how big a problem this would be in the
context of state administrative actions. State securities administrators
generally do not wield the power that the SEC does and decisions by
administrative judges would be reviewed by the state appellate courts,
not the state securities administrator itself.180
c.

Potential Solutions

The states’ challenge in funding these specialized administrative
courts and promoting their political independence could be addressed by
a set of specialized administrative courts supported by multiple states.
Such specialized courts would apply the laws of the relevant jurisdiction
and its decisions would be subject to appeal to the corresponding state’s
appellate court. There are several tangible benefits associated with such
a system. First, this system would allow the states to share the fixed
costs of maintaining a specialized administrative court dealing with
matters involving securities laws.181 Second, the judges in these
administrative courts would be exposed to a more diverse set of cases,
thus gaining more specialized knowledge and expertise. Third, these

178. Recent empirical analyses suggest that this may not be a trivial concern. According to an
analysis by the Wall Street Journal, the SEC won 90% of the time before its own judges in
contested cases between October 2010 and March 2015, substantially higher than the 69% success
rate enjoyed by the SEC in federal court over the same period. See Eaglesham, SEC Wins With InHouse Judges, supra note 80. This success rate probably underestimates the administrative court
effectiveness, as it is also likely to provide incentives for defendants to settle. See Eaglesham,
Fairness of SEC Judges in Spotlight, supra note 80 (reporting an instance where a SEC judge told
defendants that he had never ruled against the SEC’s enforcement division). It is worth noting that
these are raw figures and that the Wall Street Journal’s analysis does not control for differences in
the characteristics of cases resolved in each type of forum. A more recent and rigorous study finds
no evidence that the SEC is more likely to prevail in administrative actions. See Velikonja, supra
note 85, at 34849.
179. According to the Wall Street Journal Study, commissioner outcomes favored the SEC in
fifty-three of fifty-six cases—or 95%—from January 2010 through March 2015. See Eaglesham,
supra note 94.
180. The position of securities administrators within the government structure varies from state to
state. In some states the securities administrator is supervised by the attorney general’s office, in
others, by the secretary of state and, in others, by the department of corporations, banking, or
finance. For a list of state securities administrators, see Contact Your Regulator, NASAA,
http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/contact-us/contact-your-regulator [https://perma.cc/TG48-F6MW].
181. Some large states, such as California and New York, for example, would not need to enter
this type of arrangement, as their caseload possibly justifies maintaining a sophisticated specialized
court. Smaller states, however, could potentially benefit from such an arrangement.
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judges may be more easily insulated from political pressure (though this
will certainly depend on how they are appointed), assuaging defendants’
concerns about fairness. Finally, such a system may help in maintaining
the uniformity across states that has been achieved by the adoption of the
uniform securities acts.
States could choose to work together based on geographical proximity
and similarity in their securities laws. Although such enterprise may
require amendments to the securities laws and administrative procedural
acts of participating states, there is no reason to believe that this would
be unfeasible. The adoption of the different versions of the uniform
securities acts has led to uniformity in state law, which facilitates this
regulatory harmonization process.182 And state administrators have
effectively cooperated on a number of fronts. For example, the states,
with the support of the North American Securities Administrators
Association, have created a voluntary coordinated review program that
facilitates and expedites the process for issuers who need to make filings
with multiple state securities regulators as part of a securities offering.183
And, more generally, states have a long history of entering into interstate
compacts and interstate administrative agreements, as well as delegating
rule-making authority to interstate administrative agencies to address
and efficiently solve common problems.184
B.

State Restitution Funds as a Vehicle for Investor Compensation

As noted, victims of securities fraud may be unable to recover their
losses for a number of reasons.185 Going to court may not be
economically viable given the relatively high costs associated with
182. See supra section II.A.1.
183. COORDINATED REVIEW, http://www.coordinatedreview.org [https://perma.cc/592S-MNXZ],
provides an overview of this program. NASAA has been promoting this program to facilitate the
use of Tier 1 Regulation A+ offerings, which, unlike Tier 2 offerings, require registration at the state
level. See supra notes 54–55, 123 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Robert Agranoff, Intergovernmental Policy Management: Cooperative Practices
in Federal Systems, in THE DYNAMICS OF FEDERALISM IN NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL
POLITICAL SYSTEMS 248, 269–71 (Michael A. Pagano & Robert Leonardi eds., 2007) (describing
interstate compacts and interstate administrative agreements); FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN &
MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 44 (Council of State Gov’ts
1976) (describing the use of interstate compacts and their application to the field of state services);
JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
AGREEMENTS 217–35 (2d ed. 2012) (assessing the success of interstate compacts and administrative
agreements); Patricia S. Florestano, Past and Present Utilization of Interstate Compacts in the
United States, 25 PUBLIUS 13, 18–23 (1994) (describing historical developments in the use of
interstate compacts).
185. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
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bringing a lawsuit, the probability of losing, and the relatively small
amounts of money involved. And, even if an investor prevails, the
defendant may be judgment proof (i.e., does not have sufficient personal
assets to satisfy a judgment) or the costs of enforcing and satisfying the
judgment may be just too high. Administrative enforcement of anti-fraud
laws is one way of dealing with the first problem—the state can bring an
action and absorb the costs even if the defendant is judgment proof to
the extent that pursuing such action deters future violations of the law.186
However, it does not, by itself, address the investor’s lack of
compensation problem.
To address this second problem, and mitigate the social costs of
securities fraud, certain states have established insurance-type programs
to assist victims of securities fraud and allow them to obtain
compensation and recover part of their losses. This development, much
like the increased use of administrative actions discussed earlier, mirrors
the increased use by the SEC of fair funds to compensate injured
investors.187 In 2010, Indiana became the first state to adopt legislation
creating a special fund to provide restitution to victims of securities
fraud.188 Montana followed suit in 2011, establishing a similar
program.189 The Montana and Indiana programs, which are described
later in this section, appear to be an extension of an investor
compensation program established in Florida almost forty years ago,
which is discussed next.190

186. See Polinsky, supra note 68, at 107 (arguing that enforcement by a public agent may occur
even when potential penalties are lower than the enforcement costs due to the value of deterring
future violations); Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly
Legal System, 21 J. LEGAL. STUD. 333, 333–34 (1982) (noting that bringing lawsuits may produce
externalities, such as deterrence, which are not taken into account by private plaintiffs); Luis A.
Aguilar, Speech at the 20th Annual Sec. Litig. and Reg. Enf’t Seminar: A Stronger Enforcement
Program to Enhance Investor Protection, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch102513laa
[https://perma.cc/NR7R-VYLZ] (noting the value of deterrence in the enforcement of securities
laws). Moreover, the state may derive value from non-monetary remedies available to it, such as
injunctive relief, as it may prevent future investors from being harmed by the same perpetrator. See
supra note 149. This is not the case for individual plaintiffs (or their attorneys) for whom the
benefits associated with a lawsuit are likely to be mainly monetary.
187. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
188. See Press Release, Ind. Sec. State, Securities Restitution Fund Will Be First of Its Kind for
Indiana and Nation (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.in.gov/sos/3587.htm [https://perma.cc/2YF9H93K]. For a summary of the Indiana program, see infra notes 202–11 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 21321 and accompanying text.
190. Kansas also considered enacting a similar program in 2012. See infra notes 223–24 and
accompanying text.
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The Securities Guaranty Fund (SGF) was created as part of the
enactment of the Florida Securities Act of 1978 to assist victims of
securities laws violations.191 The SGF is funded by a portion of the
assessment fees paid by dealers and investment advisors as part of their
initial registration or renewal applications.192 Investors that have
obtained a court judgment against a licensed dealer or investment
advisor as a result of a transaction involving the sale of unregistered
securities or securities fraud are eligible to seek recovery from the
SGF.193 Prior to pursuing a claim with the SGF, the investor must take
reasonable steps to verify that the judgment debtor possesses no assets
that could be sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment.194 An
investor may apply to and receive from the SGF an amount equal to the
unsatisfied portion of the investor’s judgment or $10,000, whichever is
less.195 However, the payments of claims against any one dealer or
investment adviser are limited in the aggregate to $100,000—if total
claims exceed this limit, the SGF must prorate the payments to the
harmed investors.196 To allow the fund to ascertain whether the $100,000
cap will be binding for a particular set of claims, investors must wait two
years from the date any claimant is found to be eligible for recovery
before receiving payment based on any claim against any one dealer or
investment adviser.197
As discussed earlier, the effectiveness of private enforcement of antifraud laws is limited by the fact that certain defendants may be judgment

191. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.131, 517.141 (2015). The SGF bears some resemblance to the Securities
Investment Protection Corporation (SIPC), a broker-dealer membership corporation created by the
U.S. Congress in 1970 that acts as an insurer of funds and securities in customer accounts held at
insolvent or financially troubled broker-dealers. See J. B. Grossman, Preference Determination
Concerning Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and Securities Act of 1933, Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, and Commodity Exchange Act, 27 UALR L. REV. 533, 537 (2005). The SIPC is funded
by fees assessed on all its members. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry SelfRegulatory Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 151,
162–63 (2008). For an overview of the SIPC and its activities, see SEC. INVESTOR PROTECTION
CORP., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (Apr. 29, 2016).
192. § 517.131(1)(a).
193. §§ 517.131(2), 517.07, 517.301.
194. § 517.131(3).
195. § 517.141(1).
196. § 517.141(2).
197. § 517.141(3).
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proof, which may delay and increase the costs for an injured investor to
collect an award.198 Thus, certain investors who prevail at trial may end
up receiving little or no compensation for their losses, which decreases
investors’ incentive to bring a lawsuit in the first place. This, in turn,
reduces the deterrent effect of the securities laws on promoters (and the
broker dealers who assist them) by reducing the costs associated with
fraudulent activities. By guaranteeing investors that prevail in court a
minimum recovery, a program such as the SGF could provide investors
not only with partial compensation for the losses, but also with
additional incentives to incur the expenses associated with bringing a
lawsuit.
From an investor’s perspective, the SGF has certain noteworthy
drawbacks. Investors may only recover in situations where the fraud is
committed by a dealer or investment advisor and, even then, recovery is
capped at $10,000 (or even less if the total claims against the defendant
are more than $100,000).199 Before submitting a claim against the fund,
the investor must first obtain a court judgment and try to satisfy that
judgment against the defendant’s assets.200 This means that the investor
will have to spend time and money on court-related expenses (e.g.,
attorney fees), which can be a risky proposition, particularly in light of
the limited recovery available under the SGF. And, even then, investors
must wait two years before being able to receive compensation.201 These
factors decrease the net compensation that investors may expect to
receive from the fund, reducing their incentive to bring a lawsuit against
persons violating securities laws.
b.

Indiana’s Securities Restitution Fund

In recent years, states have begun to experiment with investor
compensation programs that are more comprehensive than Florida’s
SGF. In 2010, Indiana enacted legislation establishing a special fund
aimed at providing restitution for victims of securities fraud.202 To be
eligible, an investor must have suffered monetary loss as a result of a
“[s]ecurities violation” (which is broadly defined)203 and have a court or

198. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
199. §§ 517.131(2), 517.141(1).
200. § 517.131(2).
201. § 517.141(3).
202. P.L. 114-2010 § 12 (codified at IND. CODE § 23-20 (2015)).
203. IND. CODE § 23-20-1-6. The term “[s]ecurities violation” is broadly defined to include a
violation of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment

05 - Berdejo.docx (Do Not Delete)

606

5/28/2017 1:51 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:567

administrative agency order awarding restitution to the investor.204 If the
securities violation occurred outside Indiana, residents of Indiana might
still recover from the fund if the jurisdiction in which the securities
violation occurred does not offer them comparable assistance.205
Notably, nonresidents who are victims of a securities violation
committed in Indiana are also eligible if the jurisdiction in which the
victim resides offers Indiana residents comparable assistance.206 If the
party that was ordered to pay restitution has not paid the amount in full,
the investor may apply to receive a payment from the fund.207 Eligible
victims may receive an award equal to the lesser of twenty-five percent
of the amount of the out-of-pocket loss or $15,000.208
The fund was established with an initial $2 million endowment from
fines paid by defendants to the Indiana Securities Division and five
percent of the amounts collected for the securities division’s
enforcement account, which includes costs of investigation and civil
penalties recovered in cases of securities violations.209 Thus, it does not
directly depend on any general tax revenues, though arguably it
indirectly consumes resources that would otherwise have gone to the
state general funds.210 The first payment from the Securities Restitution
Fund, in the amount of $15,000, was awarded to an investor who lost

Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Indiana Uniform Securities Act
(IND. CODE § 23-19) and any rules or regulations promulgated under any of those acts. § 23-20-1-6.
204. §§ 23-20-1-9, 23-20-1-16(b)(1), 23-20-1-17. The order awarding restitution must have been
issued following the adjudication of the underlying securities violation in a state or federal court, or
a regulatory agency administrative proceeding. § 23-20-1-16(a).
205. § 23-20-1-11(1).
206. § 23-20-1-11(2).
207. §§ 23-20-1-9, 23-20-1-16(b)(2). The victim must file an application within 180 days from
the date of the order that entitles the victim to restitution. § 23-20-1-12(b).
208. § 23-20-1-23. The term “out-of-pocket loss” is defined as an amount equal to the restitution
ordered by the underlying court or administrative final order. § 23-20-1-4.
209. §§ 23-20-1-25(b)(2), 23-19-6-1(h). If the amount of money in the fund drops below
$250,000, the securities administrator must suspend payments for that month and the following two
months. § 23-20-1-28(a). If after this suspension period the fund would be exhausted by payment in
full of the suspended claims, then the amount paid to each claimant must be prorated. § 23-20-128(b).
210. For a discussion of the opportunity costs of these investor restitution programs see infra
section II.B.3.b(2). Moreover, if the fund did not have enough money to satisfy all claims for an
extended period of time, it is possible the general assembly could appropriate funds derived from
tax revenues for the restitution program. § 23-20-1-25(b)(2).
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$400,000.211 As of December 2016, the Indiana Securities Restitution
Fund had made nearly $550,000 in restitution payments.212
c.

Montana’s Securities Assistance Restitution Fund

In 2011, following Indiana’s footsteps, Montana established the
Securities Restitution Assistance Fund (SRAF)213 to provide partial
compensation to victims awarded restitution in a final order issued by
the commissioner or in a final order in a legal action initiated by the
commissioner, but who have not yet received the full amount of
restitution.214 Montana’s program is narrower than Indiana’s in the sense
that it only covers securities transactions in Montana that violate
Montana law215 and only Montana residents are eligible for assistance,
but it does provide a more generous compensation cap.216 An eligible
victim may receive from the fund an award equal to the lesser of
$25,000 or twenty-five percent of the amount of unpaid restitution.217 If
the victim qualifies as a “[v]ulnerable person” the maximum award is
the lesser of $50,000 or fifty percent of the amount of unpaid
restitution.218

211. See Chris O’Malley, Investor Reimbursement Fund Off to Slow Start, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J.
(Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.ibj.com/articles/48823-investor-reimbursement-fund-off-to-slow-start
[https://perma.cc/6F66-H7UX].
212. See Press Release, Ind. Sec. State, Victims of Securities Fraud Receive $56,250 in
Restitution Fund Awards From the Indiana Secretary of State’s Office Made Possible by the
Secretary of State’s Securities Restitution Fund (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/
EventList.aspx?view=EventDetails&eventidn=255324&information_id=253745
[https://perma.cc/LJ3B-BDBS].
213. 2011 Mont. Laws 207 (codified in MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-10-1001–30-10-1008 (2015)).
214. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-10-1002; 30-10-1003(1)–(6).
215. The term “[s]ecurities violation” includes violation of Montana’s securities act and any
related administrative rules. § 30-10-1003(5). Indiana residents who were victims of securities fraud
in other jurisdictions are eligible for restitution under the Indiana program. IND. CODE § 23-20-111(1)(B) (2015).
216. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-1005. Under Indiana’s program certain non-residents may be
eligible for restitution assistance. IND. CODE § 23-20-1-11(2).
217. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-1006(3). If the SRAF’s balance falls under $1 million, the
commissioner must use an established loss ratio to determine how much money a person may
receive. MONT. COMM’R. OF SEC. & INS. RULES 6.10.702-703. However, a recent amendment to the
program has made this scenario less likely. See infra notes 219–20 and accompanying text.
218. This was part of an amendment to the program enacted in 2015. 2015 Mont. Laws 86
(codified in MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-1006(4)). A “[v]ulnerable person” is defined as a person
who: (a) is at least sixty years old; (b) suffers from mental impairment because of a condition
typically related to advanced age (such as dementia or memory loss); or (c) has a developmental
disability. § 30-10-1003(7).
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Originally, the fund was to be financed by contributions from
individuals who had violated certain provisions of the Montana
Securities Act.219 Subsequent legislation made public funds available to
the SRAF by temporarily authorizing the deposit of a percentage of
securities registration, filing or renewal fees into the SRAF.220 The first
payment from Montana’s SRAF, in the amount of $13,750, was made in
July 2012 to Reece Cobeen, who had invested $55,000 in notes offered
and sold purportedly to help rebuild homes in Louisiana after Hurricane
Katrina, and which promised a twenty-four percent annual return.221 As
of June 2016, the Montana Securities Restitution Fund had distributed
over $1 million to more than seventy-five Montana victims of securities
fraud.222
d.

Other State Efforts

Although no other state has yet followed Montana and Indiana’s
footsteps, some states have considered establishing similar programs. In
2012, the Office of the Kansas Securities Commissioner introduced
legislation that would have created a securities restitution fund
administered by the administrator to provide restitution to Kansas
residents who have been awarded damages in connection with violations
of Kansas’s securities laws and regulations.223 The proposed legislation
was vague in the details, granting the commissioner broad authority to
adopt rules to specify definitions, forms, procedures, and limitations for
payment of restitution awards from the fund.224 Kansas’s assembly never
enacted this proposed legislation. In 2013, New Hampshire considered
establishing a restitution fund to compensate investors who lost money
in a major fraudulent scheme but never adopted the measure.225
219. §§ 30-10-1004(2)(a)(i), (ii).
220. 2013 Mont. Laws 137. This additional funding is scheduled to end on June 30, 2017.
221. See supra Introduction.
222. See Press Release, Office of the Mont. State Auditor, Comm’r of Sec. & Ins., Lindeen
Announces Restitution for Montana Fraud Victims (June 15, 2016), http://csimt.gov/news/
hurricane-relief-scam-victim-receives-restitution [https://perma.cc/6YEN-9SKT].
223. 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws S.B. No. 349 § 4(f); 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws H.B. No. 2582 § 5(f).
224. S.B. No. 349 § 5.
225. 2013 N.H. Laws S.B. 180. The senate bill sought to establish a recovery fund for the victims
of the Financial Resources Mortgage fraud, in which 150 investors lost $33 million in 2009. See
Garry Rayno, Ponzi Scheme Victims May Recoup Some of Their Losses, N.H. UNION LEADER (Mar.
28, 2013), http://www.unionleader.com/article/20130329/NEWS03/130328991 [https://perma.cc/
5V3B-XMR2]. Those opposed to the measure argued it would set a bad precedent and the money
could go to other state expenditures. Id. The measure was rejected by the House in 2014. See Garry
Rayno, FRM Scandal Recovery Fund Tabled by NH House, N.H. UNION LEADER (Jan. 16, 2014),
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Policy Framework for Assessing Restitution Funds

From an injured investor’s perspective, the restitution funds
established by Montana and Indiana address many of the limitations of
Florida’s SGF.226 First, investors may bring claims relating to securities
violations committed by any person, not just dealers and advisors.227
Second, investors do not need to first file a civil lawsuit and obtain a
judgment to be eligible—an administrative order or a court order in an
action brought by the securities administrator will suffice.228 This is
quite important as most, if not all, investors in small transactions may
not find it economically viable to bring a lawsuit in the first place.229
Finally, the caps on the amount recoverable by investors under both the
Indiana and Montana programs are higher than that of Florida’s SGF.230
Overall, this new generation of investor compensation programs
appears to provide greater protection for investors by increasing their
chances of receiving at least partial compensation. Of course, a program
that merely maximizes the expected compensation received by injured
investors is not necessarily desirable or optimal from society’s
perspective. Two comparable initiatives—securities fraud insurance and
crime victim compensation funds—provide an analytical framework
with which to assess the policy justifications and social welfare
implications of these securities fraud restitution programs.
a.

Restitution Funds as Insurance Against Fraud

The securities restitution funds closely resemble investor
misinformation (or securities fraud) insurance programs that have been
proposed by scholars to supplement or replace securities class actions.231

http://www.unionleader.com/article/20140116/NEWS06/140119472
[https://perma.cc/8TQ5HH5L].
226. See supra notes 201 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 203, 215 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 204, 214 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 208, 217 and accompanying text.
231. See David Skeel, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE
AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 214 (2005) (proposing an optional federal insurance fund
to provide compensation for shareholder losses stemming from corporate fraud); Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor
Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413, 415–17 (2004) (proposing a similar insurance program for fraud
related to financial statements); Evans, supra note 74, at 241–57 (proposing an investor
compensation fund that would make award to victims of securities fraud); Joshua Ronen, PostEnron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-visited, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 39,
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Although the specifics of these proposals differ,232 they all are grounded
on the shortcomings of private securities litigation and public
enforcement in achieving the goals of deterring fraud and compensating
its victims.233 The main criticisms of these insurance schemes relate to
their effect on investor behavior: namely, that investors can protect
themselves more efficiently against fraud (e.g., by diversifying),234 and
that insuring investors against fraud can lead to suboptimal investment
decisions (e.g., moral hazard).235 A second set of critiques is grounded
on fiscal concerns.236
Critics of these fraud insurance schemes note that investors can easily
eliminate the risk of fraud by just owning stock in several companies
(i.e., by diversifying their portfolios).237 A brief example illustrates this
point. Assume that an ongoing fraud is inflating the market price of the
stock of a company by $5 (i.e., so that the price of the stock would drop
by $5 if the truth was revealed). Investor A, a holder of the stock, sells it
to investor B at market price. In this particular transaction, investor A is
a winner and investor B is a loser (i.e., A sold B inflated stock).
However, in other transactions investor B may end up on the winning
side of the deal, selling a security at an artificially high price or buying
at an artificially low price. If the probability of being in the losing or
winning side is random, then an investor is as likely to gain or lose by

48–61 (2002) (proposing a mandatory financial statement insurance system to compensate
shareholders from losses stemming from financial statement misrepresentations).
232. For example, Evans’s proposed Investor Compensation Fund (ICF) would be administered
by the SEC and funded by a mandatory fee collected by exchanges in transactions involving
publicly-traded stock. See Evans, supra note 74, at 241–42. If a threshold number of shareholders
complain or the SEC enforcement division brings charges against an issuer, the ICF would then
conduct an investigation and make damage awards determinations employing administrative style
proceedings. See id. at 246–47.
233. See supra section I.A.1; Tom Baker, Insurance Against Misinformation in the Securities
Market, in TASK FORCE TO MODERNIZE SECURITIES LEGISLATION IN CANADA 373 (June 5, 2006)
(arguing that the market addresses the risk of investment losses due to misinformation by securities
litigation, public enforcement, and diversification by investors); John C. Coffee, supra note 72, at
1538 (noting that securities class actions have two main policy goals: compensation and
deterrence).
234. See infra notes 23748 and accompanying text.
235. See infra notes 24953 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 25456 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Daedalean Tinkering, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1247, 1257 (2006)
(arguing that losses guaranteed under Skeel’s investor protection program are capable of being
spread without cost by holding a diversified portfolio).
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fraud and, on average, if the investor holds enough stock in different
companies, the gains and losses should balance out.238
This idea can be more rigorously articulated by reference to modern
portfolio and asset pricing theory, which divides risk into two types—
idiosyncratic (or firm specific) risk and systemic (or market) risk. 239
Because an investor can nearly eliminate the idiosyncratic risk
associated with owning a security through diversification, the market
only compensates investors for the market (or undiversifiable) risk they
bear.240 If the risk of fraud is just like any other ordinary idiosyncratic
risk that can be easily eliminated via diversification,241 then investors
will not be compensated for bearing that risk and thus rational investors
will just diversify their portfolios to deal with this problem.242
Though persuasive in theory, the diversification argument has little
purchase in the context of small-scale securities fraud.243 An underlying
assumption of this critique is that fraud occurs after the securities have
been sold by the issuer to public investors and that insiders are not
involved in the trade (i.e., purely secondary market fraud).244 This
238. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1487, 1502 (1996); Richard A. Booth, Class Conflict in Securities Fraud Litigation, 14 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 701, 706 (2012) (“[A] diversified investor is effectively insured against securities
fraud.”); Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4
BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 1, 7 (2007) (“A diversified investor is equally likely to be on the winning side
of a given trade as on the losing side. Thus, a diversified investor is already effectively protected
against securities fraud in most cases.”).
239. See Evans, supra note 74, at 227–28.
240. See Booth, Class Conflict in Securities Fraud Litigation, supra note 238, at 712 (“An
undiversified investor assumes unnecessary risk for the same expected return that diversified
investors enjoy.”). Existing studies indicate a portfolio containing as few as twenty stocks can
eliminate more than ninety-nine percent of firm-specific risk. See Franco Modigliani & Gerald A.
Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return: Concepts and Evidence, 30 FIN. ANAL. J. 68, 74–75
(1974) (finding that a portfolio of twenty stocks can essentially eliminate company specific risk).
241. See Booth, The End of the Securities Class Action as We Know It, supra note 238, at 13
(arguing that the risk of simple securities fraud is like any other ordinary business risk).
242. See id. at 7 (“Through diversification, an investor can avoid significant company-specific
risk without any reduction in return and can do so at no cost. Because it is irrational to assume more
risk than necessary, it follows that rational investors diversify.”); Pritchard, supra note 72, at 946
(“[C]ompensation [in the form of securities class actions] as a form of insurance makes little sense
if the victim of fraud can avoid the risk at a lower cost.”).
243. Some scholars are skeptical of this argument even in cases involving secondary market
fraud. See, e.g., Booth, The End of the Securities Class Action as We Know It, supra note 238, at 5
(arguing that if the price declines not just to where it would be in absence of fraud but goes lower
due to uncertainty, then losses to investors exceed their gains and investors on average lose on
account of fraud); Evans, supra note 74, at 229.
244. See Booth, The End of the Securities Class Action as We Know It, supra note 238, at 9
(“Diversified investors suffer no harm from securities fraud except in those cases in which insider
trading subtracts wealth from the market.”); John C. Coffee, supra note 72, at 1537 (“In the typical
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assumption is what allows investors to sometimes end up on the winning
side of the transaction.245 However, in the context of the small-scale
fraud that is the subject of this Article, the fraud often occurs when the
issuer or the promoter sells the security to investors. One could argue
that the risk of fraud associated with acquiring illiquid securities from a
promoter in a small offering can still be partially diversified by holding a
portfolio that is heavily weighted toward securities listed on a national
exchange and purchased in the secondary market. But here, we
encounter another problematic assumption of the diversification
argument: investors will diversify because it is rational to do so.246
Existing empirical evidence strongly suggests that investors do not
diversify,247 a phenomenon that can be attributed to a number of
factors.248 To the extent that financial sophistication and diversification
are correlated, it would not be surprising to find that victims of smallscale fraud are not diversified.
A second economic critique of fraud insurance schemes centers
around the problem of moral hazard—once individuals are insured
against a risk, they have less incentive to avoid or reduce the loss
associated with that risk.249 In other words, having insurance against
fraud may reduce the incentive of investors to avoid investing in
securities that pose higher risk and, as a result, investors may be less
careful and take socially undesirable risks that they would otherwise
have not taken in the absence of insurance.250 The problem of moral
hazard is not trivial or theoretical—according to some scholars, moral
secondary market case, the corporation is not selling its securities and thus does not receive any
‘direct benefit’ . . . when its managers inflate its earnings and stock price.”).
245. See Pritchard, supra note 72, at 945–46 (“If fraud on the market can, for the most part, be
diversified away, investors’ losses from trades affected by that fraud are not really a social cost.”).
246. See Booth, The End of the Securities Class Action as We Know It, supra note 238, at 11–12
(arguing that if investors can diversify away risk of fraud, then it is rational for them to do so; and
the law should only protect reasonable investors); Evans, supra note 74, at 230.
247. See Evans, supra note 74, at 234 (citing evidence from the survey of consumer finances
published by the Federal Reserve which finds that almost sixty percent of individual investors hold
stock in three or fewer companies and thirty-five percent hold just in one).
248. See id. at 235 n.50 (noting the reasons explaining this lack of diversification, which include
an illusory sense of control stemming from direct involvement in the investment process and
gambling tendencies, among others).
249. A classic account of the economic theory behind the moral hazard problem is presented in
Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (Spring 1979). For an
overview of the role of moral hazard in the law, see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral
Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996); TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW & POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS 48 (2003) (discussing moral hazard).
250. See Baker, supra note 233, at 381; Griffith, supra note 237, at 1256 (arguing that fraud
insurance schemes will lead investors to take on more risk).
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hazard problems caused by deposit contributed to the 1980s savings and
loans crisis.251
Insurance markets have devised a number of mechanisms to minimize
the impact of moral hazard by providing adequate incentives for the
insured to take precautions to prevent harm from occurring. Insurance
contracts achieve this by providing only partial coverage for an insured’s
losses (i.e., requiring the insured to share part of the loss) via deductibles
(i.e., a baseline amount of the loss that must be absorbed by the
individual), copayments (i.e., a percentage of the loss above the
deductible that is not covered), and coverage limits (i.e., capping the
amount of losses that are recoverable).252 As discussed later in this
Article, the securities restitution funds have features that mimic these
mechanisms, providing some reassurance that moral hazard will not lead
to an unraveling of these programs.253
The final set of concerns highlighted by critics of the securities fraud
insurance schemes are fiscal in nature—the associated costs and the
manner the programs are funded. Effectively administering these
insurance schemes is likely to consume significant monetary and human
resources, and if the costs are high enough, they may effectively offset
any relative benefits associated with the insurance programs.254 In
addition, there are opportunity costs and distributional concerns as
well.255 The relevance of these fiscal and distributional issues in the
context of the securities restitution funds is addressed later in this
Article.256

251. See Griffith, supra note 237, at 1256 (drawing a comparison between the moral hazard that
would be created by securities fraud insurance and the moral hazard problems created by deposit
insurance regimes that led to the savings and loan crisis of the mid 1980s); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Banking Regulation: The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 19 (1987)
(explaining that deposit insurance creates moral hazard by giving banks the incentive to take
excessive risks because they capture the benefits while the costs are borne by the insurance fund);
Kenneth E. Scott, Never Again: The S&L Bailout Bill, 45 BUS. LAW. 1883, 1898 (1990) (“The
magnitude of [the FDIC and FSLIC losses] . . . was occasioned by a literal explosion of . . . moral
hazard.”).
252. See generally Ronen Avrahama, The Economics of Insurance Law – A Primer, 19 CONN.
INS. L. J. 30 (2012), 70–71 (describing various contractual solutions to the moral hazard problem in
the insurance context). In addition, insurance companies obtain subrogation rights, which allow the
insurer to seek redress from responsible parties. Id. at 81.
253. See infra notes 27175 and accompanying text.
254. See Griffith, supra note 237, at 1255–56 (criticizing an existing investor compensation
scheme proposal “based on administrability and cost”).
255. See id. at 1256.
256. See infra section II.B.3.b.
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Restitution Funds as a Crime Victim Compensation Fund

The securities restitution funds also share some features with crime
victim compensation programs.257 Generally, to be eligible under these
compensation programs, an individual must have been a victim of a
violent crime and suffered bodily injury or death.258 In addition, the
victim must facilitate law enforcement’s prosecution efforts by reporting
the crime promptly and cooperating with police and prosecutors.259
Qualifying victims may be compensated for certain eligible expenses
related to the criminal injury.260 However, the total available award is
often capped (with the maximum varying by state),261 and in some states
eligibility is conditioned on financial need.262 Victim compensation
programs are predominantly financed by criminal fines and penalties,

257. For an overview of how victim compensation programs work, see generally Crime Victim
Compensation: An Overview, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS,
http://www.nacvcb.org/index.asp?bid=14 [https://perma.cc/J5U5-X8VM]; SUSAN HERMAN AND
MUCHELLE WAUL, NAT’L. CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, REPAIRING THE HARM: A NEW VISION FOR
CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION IN AMERICA 1932 (July 2004), https://victimsofcrime.org/
docs/Comp%20Roundtable/Repairing%20the%20Harm%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKY5YNW5]. Today, all fifty states operate a victim compensation program. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF
CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD: CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION,
NCJ 170600, at 325 (1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/directions/pdftxt/chap14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3TX-V6F3]. At the federal level, the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA)
provides compensation to victims of federal crimes and grants to the states that operate qualifying
victim compensation programs. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
2170 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601110605 (2012)).
258. See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 5-2-6.1-7, 5-2-6.1-8 (2015). Violent crimes generally include felony
or Class A misdemeanors that result in bodily injury or death to the victim. Id.; see also OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 147.005(4), (15) (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-103(3), (5) (2015); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 7.68.020(5), (15) (2016); FLA. STAT. §§ 960.03(3), (14) (2016); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-152(3), 17-15-7(a)(1) (2016); 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(1) (2012) (defining eligibility criteria for states to
receive federal grants to fund their victim compensation programs).
259. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(2) (requiring programs to promote cooperation with law
enforcement).
260. Eligible expenses commonly include medical care, mental health treatment, funerals, and
lost wages, among others. See Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, supra note 257; HERMAN
AND WAUL, supra note 257, at 21.
261. All states cap monetary recovery at amounts ranging from $5,000 to $180,000, with an
average cap of approximately $35,000; in 2001, the median award nationally was $2,400. See Julie
Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 TUL. L. REV. 167, 190 (2004).
For example, in Indiana, the maximum award under the victim compensation program is $15,000,
which coincides with the maximum award under the investor restitution fund. IND. CODE § 5-2-6.135(a)(1).
262. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 960.13(8); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7305(d) (2016); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 346.140(3) (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 18.361(7) (2016); and N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 631(6)(a) (2016).
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federal Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA) grants and, in a few
states, general revenue funds.263
Several rationales have been offered in support of victim
compensation programs.264 The first set of justifications relates to the
state’s obligation to maintain safety and security. Because the
maintenance of safety and security is a public good provided by the
state, when someone falls prey to a violent crime, the state has failed and
thus must compensate the victim.265 Crime victim compensation
programs serve as a way of distributing the costs of crime across
society—i.e., as a system of public insurance that covers a risk (crime)
to which all citizens in a society are exposed and thus helps spread the
losses that result from that risk by compensating victims and enhancing
social welfare.266 This first set of justifications for victim compensation
programs is not persuasive in the context of securities fraud.
A second set of justifications suggests that victim compensation
programs may also have a deterrent effect by increasing the size of the
penalty paid by criminals and their probability of being detected,
potentially playing a role in reducing crime.267 To the extent that
263. See HERMAN AND WAUL, supra note 257, at 23. State compensation programs that meet
certain criteria are eligible to receive federal VOCA grants, which are also funded by federal
criminal fines and penalties. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10602(a)-(b)(6), 10601(b).
264. See Goldscheid, supra note 261, at 212 (organizing these rationales into four groups: legal
obligation, social welfare, shared risks, and support to the criminal justice system).
265. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL REMEDIES FOR THE EVIL OF OFFENSES (1838),
reprinted in CONSIDERING THE VICTIM 29–42 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1975) (arguing
that the community ought to be taxed to repair the damage caused because it bears responsibility for
violent offenses); Robert D. Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 444, 455–56 (1964) (arguing that aside from the criminal, the state is the party “next
most responsible” for the crime); Margery Fry, Justice for Victims, 8 J. PUB. L. 191, 191–92 (1959)
(arguing that society’s “collective responsibility for sickness and injury” and its “modern” systems
of sharing the cost of social risks warrants public provision of assistance for victims); Arthur J.
Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 205, 224–25 (1964) (arguing that
government should compensate crime victims because crime reflects society’s inattention to poverty
and social injustice).
266. See Fry, supra note 265, at 192–93. See also Bentham, supra note 265, at 39 (arguing that
while the best source of compensation for losses resulting from crime is the offender, the cost of
losses that the offender cannot pay should be borne by the state because “it is an object of public
benefit; the security of all is concerned”); Childres, supra note 265, at 457–59 (referencing the
failure of private insurance in the workers’ compensation context to conclude that victim
compensation should be funded by the state).
267. See Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, The Role of Private Action in Controlling Crime, in
CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS 349–51 (2011) (discussing how victim
compensation programs can, in conjunction with other programs, enhance deterrence by increasing
cooperation by victims); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 176–79 (1968) (modelling criminal behavior as a balancing of the benefits of a
crime against the probability of being detected and the penalties imposed upon detection); Gary S.
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defendant fines and fees comprise funds used to pay victims, the size of
the penalty paid by criminals is increased. However, it is hard to imagine
that these additional monetary amounts recovered through
supplementary fines, fees, and restitution would be substantial enough to
effect any marginal change in offender behavior. But even if the amount
of the penalty (conditional on conviction) remains relatively unchanged,
the probability of detection and conviction of criminals may be increased
if victims are more likely to come forward and cooperate with law
enforcement officials, knowing that they may receive some sort of
monetary compensation.268 Whether compensation programs can in
practice achieve this goal is an open question, given the limited size of
the awards received by victims under these programs.269 This second set
of justifications for victim compensation programs appears more
compelling in the context of securities fraud, and its implications will be
discussed in more detail later in this Article.270
3.

An Economic Assessment of Securities Restitution Funds

a.

Effect on Investor Behavior
i.

Moral Hazard: Will Investors Be More Likely to Take
Unnecessary Risks?

Even though the securities restitution funds are not technically
insurance programs, they arguably raise moral hazard concerns in a
manner that victim compensation programs do not.271 One may worry
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1974) (“Enforcement is generally more effective against violations with
victims because victims have a stake in apprehending violators, especially when they receive
restitution.”).
268. The congressional findings accompanying the final version of VOCA highlighted
Congress’s hope that the compensation program would promote victim cooperation. The Victims of
Crime Assistance Act of 1984: Hearing on S.2423 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. 9–10 (1984).
269. See, e.g., Charlene L. Smith, Victim Compensation: Hard Questions and Suggested
Remedies, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 51, 69–70 (1985) (arguing that economic incentives do not appear to
provide adequate incentives for victims to cooperate); Goldscheid, supra note 261, at 217 (noting
that “the modest amount of available awards and the relative lack of awareness of the programs
among victims” may explain why programs may not have a “substantial impact on victims’
willingness to cooperate with law enforcement”). These type of problems could similarly hinder the
potential effectiveness of securities restitution funds.
270. See infra section II.B.3.a(2).
271. This is in part due to the non-monetary nature of the victim’s loss in the latter. Would
someone take fewer precautions because of the prospect of partially recovering some of the
monetary losses associated with a crime?
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that investors who are aware of the existence of a securities fraud
restitution program may take unnecessary risks (or risks they would not
otherwise take) in search of a high return by investing in speculative and
dubious investments, knowing that if things turn out well they will earn
a high return but that if things do not they are likely to receive some
partial recovery from the fund. In the context of small, private securities
offerings, moral hazard can present greater concerns relative to
transactions in the public secondary markets. Providing incentives to
investors to protect themselves against fraud in the public markets (e.g.,
by double-checking and fact-checking companies’ reports and regulatory
filings) could result in wasteful and duplicative expenditures. However,
in the smaller, private transactions that are the subject of this Article,
society may prefer investors to be more skeptical and carefully conduct
adequate research to protect themselves before purchasing securities.
In practice, however, moral hazard is unlikely to pose a significant
problem in this context. First, for moral hazard to become a concern, you
need individuals to be aware of the terms of the restitution programs
beforehand and be somewhat certain that they will have a right to
recover from the fund. Moreover, as noted earlier, the insurance market
minimizes the impact of moral hazard on individual behavior by making
the insured bear part of the loss, often via deductibles, copayments and
maximum recovery caps.272
As designed, the Montana and Indiana restitution funds possess all
these mechanisms. Prior to bringing a claim, an investor must have a
judgment against the individual who violated the securities laws and
must show that such judgment cannot be satisfied.273 Thus, the investor
must either bring a lawsuit against the violator or convince the securities
administrator to bring a civil or administrative action against the
perpetrator and cooperate with such investigation. Requiring the investor
to make these monetary and non-monetary outlays prior to bringing a
claim against the fund serves as the functional equivalent of a
deductible. And, even after the investor properly files a claim against the
restitution fund, the investor is only entitled to partial recovery and will
have to absorb a substantial portion of the losses. In Montana, for
example, the investor must bear twenty-five percent of his or her losses
up to $100,000 and 100 percent of the losses beyond that (as the
maximum recovery is $25,000).274 And, in Indiana, investors seeking

272. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 207, 214 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 214–17 and accompanying text.
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compensation still have to bear twenty-five percent of their losses up to
$60,000 and 100 percent of the losses after that (as the maximum
recovery is $15,000).275 It thus seems unlikely that recovery under these
programs will incentivize investors to undertake excessive risk.276
ii.

Enhanced Cooperation of Fraud Victims with Securities
Administrators

By providing monetary incentives to encourage injured investors to
come forward and notify the securities administrators of a securities law
violation, restitution programs may affect investor behavior in a manner
that is desirable from society’s perspective. As noted earlier, in securities
fraud cases involving small monetary amounts, investors may not have
the incentive to bring a lawsuit.277 This is an undesirable outcome as
there are positive externalities associated with private securities fraud
lawsuits. For example, by increasing the expected penalties for
fraudsters, lawsuits serve a deterrent effect. In addition, the filing of a
private lawsuit can also alert the securities administrator, who can then
investigate and further penalize the securities violator.
As is the case with many activities that produce positive externalities,
investors may not bring lawsuits or file complaints at a socially desirable
275. See supra notes 203–08 and accompanying text.
276. To place these recovery amounts in perspective, we can compare these to the actual losses
suffered by investors in these fraudulent schemes. As noted earlier, the first payment from the
Indiana Securities Restitution Fund, in the amount of $15,000, was awarded to an investor who had
lost $400,000. See supra note 211. On February 2015, several Indiana investors who lost their life
savings in a series of Ponzi schemes received restitution payments from the fund. See Press Release,
Ind. Sec. State, Secretary Lawson Awards Over $150,000 in Securities Restitution Funds to 14
Hoosier Investors Robbed of Retirement (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/
EventList.aspx?type=public&eventidn=209051&view=EventDetails&information_id=211275&prin
t=print [https://perma.cc/J5N3-ACQM]. In one of these schemes, thirty investors lost $1.4 million
(about $46,666 on average). See Press Release, Ind. Sec. State, Indianapolis Man Sentenced to 10
Years for Running a Ponzi Scheme (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/
EventList.aspx?view=EventDetails&eventidn=190303&information_id=207219
[https://perma.cc/N6ND-J6EY]. More recently, the Indiana fund made restitution payments to a
number of investors who were victims in a real estate development fraudulent scheme. See Press
Release, Ind. Sec. State, Victims of Securities Fraud Receive $62,500 in Restitution Fund Awards
from the Indiana Secretary of State’s Office Made Possible by the Secretary of State’s Securities
Restitution Fund (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/EventList.aspx?public&
eventidn=254286&view=EventDetails&information_id=252912&print=print [https://perma.cc/A5
7M-HTLF]. In this scheme thirty-six investors lost $2.18 million (an average of just over $60,000).
See Bob Kasarda, Pair Ordered to Pay Back $2.1 Million in Porter County Investment Scam, THE
TIMES OF NORTHWEST INDIANA (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/porter/pairordered-to-pay-back-million-in-porter-county-investment/article_865630f1-376b-5c9d-90eba35d3afd1f5a.html [https://perma.cc/YP5G-EYJ4].
277. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
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level if in doing so they have to bear the costs (monetary and otherwise)
without receiving a sufficiently large benefit in return, even if the social
benefits of their actions would far outweigh their private costs.278 By
providing investors a larger return to filing a lawsuit in court or a
complaint with state securities regulators, restitution programs may align
private and social interests and enhance the deterrent effects of the
securities laws. Such effect on investor behavior would certainly be
greater in those states that also allow the securities administrator to order
restitution on behalf of the investor at the conclusion of an
administrative action, as the upfront costs for the investor are lower.
b.

Fiscal, Monetary, and Distributional Concerns
i.

Are Securities Restitution Funds Too Small to Meet Their
Goal?

One concern is whether the amounts that investors may recover from
the funds are large enough to compensate investors and encourage them
to assist securities administrators in the detection and investigation of
securities fraud. Consider an investor who lost $40,000. Under either the
Montana or Indiana program, the maximum recovery for this investor
would be $10,000 (i.e., twenty-five percent of the investor’s losses).279
Certainly, $10,000 is much less than $40,000, and one wonders to what
extent the investor will be able to recover financially from the
unfortunate event. Moreover, if the amounts that an investor can recover
from the fund are not large enough, the investor may not have the
incentive to pursue a case in court or cooperate with the securities
administrator. This problem is amplified by the fact that the partial
recovery of $10,000 is uncertain (e.g., the action may be unsuccessful or
the fund may run out of money), further reducing the expected
compensation for the investor.
There are some obvious problems with granting larger awards.
Providing investors with higher levels of compensation may exacerbate
the moral hazard problem outlined earlier. Though this may be true for
any increases in the percentage of losses that may be recoverable and for
the savvier investors, it is not clear whether increasing the maximum cap
(currently $25,000 in Montana and $15,000 in Indiana) would have such

278. See Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public
Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 155–58 (2004) (providing an illustration of the underprovision of activities with positive externalities).
279. See supra notes 208, 217 and accompanying text.
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detrimental effects on investors’ ex ante behavior.280 A more pressing
concern is that providing higher levels of compensation would demand
more funding, as it would drain any available funds more quickly.
Because the restitution funds are not financed with tax revenues, this is
likely to result in shortfalls, leading to increasing delays and lower levels
of compensation for injured investors.281
One possible strategy that may allow for more sizable recovery
amounts while avoiding budgetary shortfalls would be to have claims
against the funds be means tested like some victim compensation
programs.282 For example, one could imagine a system where only
persons with income below a certain level may fully recover the
maximum statutory amount. For those investors with annual incomes
above this threshold, the amount that may be recovered from the fund
would be phased out gradually. This system would promote one of the
goals of the restitution funds—provide compensation to investors,
particularly those less wealthy individuals, who are the ones more likely
to be hurt by a small financial loss.283 The drawback, however, is that
those individuals who cannot recover from the fund would have fewer
monetary incentives to bring a lawsuit or alert the administrator to the
securities fraud (though non-monetary factors such as quenching a thirst
for revenge would still provide some incentives to report to the
administrator).284 Eligibility could be based on non-monetary factors,
such as membership in groups seen as easy targets by fraudsters.
Montana has adopted a similar strategy by increasing the amount of
money that may be recovered by “vulnerable” individuals (including, for
example, senior citizens) to the lesser of $50,000 or fifty percent of the
amount of unpaid restitution.285

280. Id.
281. See supra notes 20910, 21920 and accompanying text. This concern likely led to
Montana’s legislation which expanded the source of funding for the restitution programs a few
years after its establishment. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. A fiscal note
accompanying the Montana bill estimated that annual revenues from the additional funding sources
would equal approximately $272,000.
282. See supra notes 22829 and accompanying text.
283. Moreover, to the extent these investors are less savvy, the impact of moral hazard on their
behavior is likely to be relatively attenuated.
284. This concern may be lessened if wealthier individuals have the resources and incentives to
bring a private lawsuit regardless of their ability to recover from the fund.
285. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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Opportunity Costs & Distributional Concerns

In assessing the social welfare consequences of establishing a
restitution fund, one must consider more than just the direct costs and
benefits associated with such a program. In a world of limited and scarce
resources, undertaking a new program sponsored and funded by the
government often means that the state must reduce the size of other
programs or maybe even abandon some programs altogether. This
section considers two general types of programs that may be adversely
impacted by the introduction of securities restitution funds: fraud
prevention activities conducted by securities administrators and
programs unrelated to the securities regulation area.
If the funds devoted to a new restitution program would have
remained within the administrative agency’s budget (instead of being
remitted to the state’s general treasury), one may worry that the newly
created funds would receive monies previously earmarked in the
administrator’s budget for essential areas such as securities enforcement
or investor education programs. To the extent that enforcement activities
can generally result in the recovery of funds (via fines or settlements for
example) for the administrator, one may not expect their levels to be
affected by the introduction of the restitution programs. However,
investor education programs, which are not revenue generating, may be
adversely affected.
In fact, many state securities administrators use investor education
programs as part of their toolkit in combating fraud.286 These programs
generally prepare informational materials and engage in outreach events
(such as presentations) to teach individuals about investing strategies
and how to avoid falling victim to fraud.287 Most of these programs,
including Indiana’s, are funded in part by funds collected from
settlements in securities fraud cases litigated by the securities
administrators (i.e., those being partially diverted to restitution funds).288
One may wonder whether the money diverted to the restitution funds
should rather be invested in these types of preventive programs.
Although these programs are certainly an important part of the securities
administrators’ toolkits to combat fraud, their effectiveness is still an

286. See, e.g., Investor Education, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/investor-education
[https://perma.cc/XP4P-QTLF] (“State . . . securities regulators have a long tradition of protecting
investors through financial education.”).
287. See Educational Outreach, IN.GOV, https://secure.in.gov/sos/securities/2421.htm [https://
perma.cc/M7N4-86TU] (describing Indiana’s investor education program).
288. Id.
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open question in light of the particular groups that are often victimized,
and behavioral limitations in human decision-making.289 Though an
assessment of alternative fraud-preventive programs relative to
restitution funds is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be
acknowledged that by adopting an investor restitution program, a state is
affirmatively choosing among different strategies to combat fraud.
If the amounts deposited in the restitution fund come from the state’s
general fund or from a source that would have otherwise gone to the
general fund, then the social calculus must also consider the opportunity
costs of such a transfer (i.e., the alternative use of the money in the
provision of other government programs that has been foregone) and the
resulting distributional effects.290 This concern gains greater prominence
in an age of budget deficits and cuts to education and health programs.
As an illustration, we can briefly examine the general appropriations in
Indiana’s 2016 budget.291 The two major components of this part of the
state’s budget are K-12 education (forty-six percent) and Medicaid
(thirteen percent).292 Arguably, a dollar spent to provide restitution to a
defrauded investor is a dollar that cannot be spent on K-12 education,
providing healthcare to those in need, etc. But determining the
distributional effects certainly is not as easy as that. Perhaps this dollar
(or a portion of it) would have stayed in the state administrator’s budget.
Or even if it had gone to the general revenue, the dollar may have been
spent in programs less commendable than K-12 education and health
care for the poor. In any event, in addressing these distributional
concerns, the identity of the securities restitution fund recipients also
matters, as many of these (such as the elderly) may otherwise be the
recipients of aid from the state. Ultimately, these are all issues for state
legislatures to consider and weigh. But at the very least, these concerns
289. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Deception, Decisions, and Investor Education, 17 ELDER L. J.
201, 20304 (2009) (question the effectiveness of financial education programs targeted at older
adults, who are disproportionally victimized by fraudsters); Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial
Literacy Education, 94 IOWA. L. REV. 197, 201 (2008) (“[F]inancial literacy is not sufficient for
good financial decision-making; heuristics, biases, and emotional-coping mechanisms that at times
interfere with welfare-enhancing personal-finance behaviors are unlikely to be eradicated through
education, particularly in a dynamic market.”); Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy,
101 AM. ECON. REV. 429, 43031 (2011) (arguing that behavioral biases reduce the effectiveness of
financial education programs).
290. This is a concern even for programs funded with fees obtained by the securities
administrators from brokers and investment advisors. Generally, these funds are used to finance
essential programs, offset funding shortfalls and remitted to the state’s general treasury.
291. See Budget Information–FY 16 General Appropriations, IN.GOV: IND. TRANSPARENCY
PORTAL, http://in.gov/itp/2340.htm [https://perma.cc/WJ96-H8XB].
292. Id.
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stress once again the importance of considering some sort of means
testing and lend additional support for a system that focuses on a
vulnerable portion of the population.293
c.

Jurisdictional, Transactional, and Residency Requirements

The long-term success of these investor restitution programs may be
determined not just by the amount of the recovery provided to injured
investors, but also by the strictness of their eligibility requirements. For
example, Montana’s restitution program provides a higher maximum
recovery than Indiana’s, but it is more restrictive in other key dimensions.
First, Montana’s restitution fund only covers violations of Montana laws
and regulations, while Indiana covers not only violations of Indiana laws
and regulations, but of federal violations as well.294 Second, while an
investor seeking to establish a claim against the restitution fund in Montana
must have an order from the Montana securities commissioner or an order
from a Montana court requested by the commissioner, Indiana only requires
that the investor have a court order or an administrative order.295 Finally,
while only Montana residents are eligible under that state’s restitution fund,
Indiana provides coverage to non-resident investors from states that afford
analogous protection to Indiana residents.296
Having greater flexibility in jurisdictional, transactional, and residency
requirements will likely make any single investor compensation program
more expensive, as more investors will be able to file claims for restitution.
However, more flexible requirements (such as those in Indiana’s program)
could lead a more widespread adoption of these programs, as states seek to
establish reciprocity with each other, and promote future cooperation on this
front. Conceivably, one could envision states cooperating in administering
common securities restitution funds, further spreading the risks and costs
associated with these programs.297
CONCLUSION
Although often overlooked in the academic literature and financial press,
small-scale securities fraud can have devastating consequences for the most
293. See supra notes 28285 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 203, 215 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 204, 214 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 20506, 216 and accompanying text.
297. This parallels an earlier recommendation in this Article calling for increased cooperation
among states in establishing and administering specialized administrative courts. See supra notes
18284.
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vulnerable of investors—those who may be more susceptible to becoming
victims in the first place and who stand to lose a significant share of their
life savings. Traditional enforcement mechanisms at the federal level often
fail in these cases, making state law and enforcement indispensable. And
with the continuing trend of deregulation at the federal level and an everoverburdened SEC, state regulators must assume an even greater role in
protecting local investors.
States are responding to this challenge, and this Article highlights two
innovative strategies developed by different states to protect investors. The
first, granting state securities administrators the power to order restitution on
behalf of injured investors, has been slowly developing for decades and has
by now been adopted by almost half the states. The second strategy,
establishing restitution funds to assist investors in their recovery, is at a
more nascent state and has only been fully implemented in two states. These
two strategies can complement each other. An injured investor can notify
the securities administrator of a securities violation; wait for the
administrator to initiate administrative proceedings and order restitution;
and then file for a claim against the fund if the violator does not satisfy the
administrator’s order.
These developments are without doubt encouraging, but there remains
work to be done. More states should authorize their administrators to grant
orders of restitution in cases involving securities fraud. Increased
cooperation and coordination among the states in establishing and
maintaining specialized administrative courts should facilitate this process.
The securities restitution funds established in Indiana and Montana are
novel and intriguing ideas. Whether these programs can be successful is an
open question, but there is plenty of room for improvement and optimism.
Adjusting the size of awards by imposing a “means-testing” on investor
recovery could address both fiscal and behavioral concerns. Allowing outof-state investors to recover could lead to more widespread adoption of
these programs and encourage cooperation among state securities
administrators.
Although these legislative advances appear to further the goals of
compensating injured investors and deterring untoward behavior, they
cannot be considered in a vacuum. This Article stressed the importance of
understanding the effect of these strategies on the behavior of investors and
administrators and how behavioral changes by these actors could have both
positive and undesirable consequences. Gaining this understanding is
critical for the design of successful programs and institutions that will both
deter securities fraud and compensate its victims in a cost-effective manner.
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APPENDIX
Table 1:
Authority of Administrator to Request Restitution in a Civil Action
or Order Restitution in an Administrative Action
State

(1) Can
Administrator
Request Restitution?
Alabama
Yes
Alaska
No
Arizona
Yes
Arkansas
Yes
California
Yes
Colorado
Yes
Connecticut
Yes
Delaware
Yes
Florida
Yes
Georgia
Yes
Hawaii
Yes
Idaho
Yes
Illinois
Yes
Indiana
Yes
Iowa
Yes
Kansas
Yes
Kentucky
Yes
Louisiana
No
Maine
Yes
Maryland
Yes
Massachusetts Yes
Michigan
Yes
Minnesota
Yes
Mississippi
Yes
Missouri
Yes
Montana
Yes
Nebraska
Yes
Nevada
Yes

(2) Can
Administrator
Order Restitution?
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
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State

New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North
Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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(1) Can
Administrator
Request Restitution?

(2) Can
Administrator
Order Restitution?

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No

Yes

No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
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Table 2:
Authority of Administrator to Request Restitution in a Civil Action
or Order Restitution in an Administrative Proceeding
State

Code Section Re:
Civil Court

Alabama

ALA. CODE § 8-6-16(B)
(2016)
ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.55.920(A) (2016)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-2037(A) (2016)
ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 23-42-20 (2016)
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25535
(West 2016)
COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 11-51-602 (2016)
CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 36B-27(E) (2016)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
73-602 (2016)
FLA. STAT. § 517.191
(2016)
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-72
(2016)
HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 485A-603 (2016)
IDAHO CODE
§ 30-14-603 (2016)
815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 5/11 (I) (2016)
IND. CODE § 23-19-6-3
(2016)
IOWA CODE § 502.603
(2016)
KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-12A603 (2016)

Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas

Code Section Re:
Administrative Actions
ALA. CODE § 8-6-19
(2016)
ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.55.920(B) (2016)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-2032(1) (2016)
ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 23-42-20 (2016)
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25532
(West 2016)
COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 11-51-605 (2016)
CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 36B-27 (2016)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 73-601 (2016)
FLA. STAT. § 517.221
(2016)
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-73
(2016)
HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 485A-604 (2016)
IDAHO CODE
§ 30-14-604 (2016)
815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 5/11 (2016)
IND. CODE § 23-19-6-4
(2016)
IOWA CODE § 502.604
(2016)
KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-12A604 (2016)

05 - Berdejo.docx (Do Not Delete)

628

5/28/2017 1:51 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

State

Code Section Re:
Civil Court

Kentucky

KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 292.470(2) (West 2016)
LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 713(A)(2) (2016)
ME. STAT. tit. 32,
§ 16603 (2016)
MD. CODE CORP. ANN. &
ASSOC. § 14–111 (West
2016)
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch.
110A, § 408 (2016)
MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 451.2603 (2016)
MINN. STAT. § 80A.80
(2016)
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-71603 (2016)
MO. REV. STAT.
§ 409.6-603 (2016)
MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 30-10-305 (2016)
NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1116
(2016)
NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.640
(2016)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421-B:6-603(B) (2016)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-69
(West 2016)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5813C-603 (2016)
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 353
(McKinney 2016)
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 78A-47(A) (2016)
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-04-16 (2016)

Louisiana
Maine
Maryland

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

[Vol. 92:567

Code Section Re:
Administrative Actions
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
292.5 (West 2016)
LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 713(A)(1) (2016)
ME. STAT. tit. 32,
§ 16604 (2016)
MD. CODE, CORP. ANN. &
ASSOC. § 14–210 (West
2016)
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch.
110A, § 407A (2016)
MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 451.2604 (2016)
MINN. STAT. § 80A.81
(2016)
MISS. CODE ANN. § 7571-604 (2016)
MO. REV. STAT.
§ 409.6-604 (2016)
MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 30-10-305 (2016)
NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1115
(2016)
NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.630
(2016)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421-B:6-604(E) (2016)
N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 49:3-68.1 (West 2016)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5813C-604 (2016)
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW
§ 23-A (2016 McKinney)
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 78A-47(B) (2016)
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-04-16(1) (2016)

05 - Berdejo.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

SMALL INVESTMENTS, BIG LOSSES

State

Code Section Re:
Civil Court

Ohio

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1707.261 (West 2016)
OKLA. STAT. tit. 71,
§ 1-603 (2016)
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 59.331
(2016)
70 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1-509(A) (2016)
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-11-603
(2016)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1603 (2016)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 47-31B-603 (2016)
TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 48-1-119 (2016)
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. § 32 (West 2016)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-120(2) (West 2016)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 5603 (2016)
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-520.1 (2016)
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 21.20.390 (2016)
W. VA. CODE § 32-4-408
(2016)
WIS. STAT. §551.603(3)
(2016)
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-4120 (2016)

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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Code Section Re:
Administrative Actions
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1707.23 (West 2016)
OKLA. STAT. tit. 71,
§ 1-604 (2016)
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 59.245
(2016)
70 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1-606 (2016)
R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 7-11-602 (2016)
S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-604 (2016)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 47-31B-604 (2016)
TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 48-1-116 (2016)
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. § 23 (West 2016)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-120 (West 2016)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 5604(D) (2016)
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-521 (2016)
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 21.20.390, 395 (2016)
W. VA. CODE § 32-4-407A
(2016)
WIS. STAT. § 551.604
(2016)
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-4124(F) (2016)

